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PARADISE POSTPONED: SUSPENSIONS OF
AGENCY RULES
PETER

D.

HOLMESt

Attorneys for federal regulatoryagencies often are asked about the
possibility of suspending an agency rule. An attorney in this situation
must resolve a number of questions; these questions are complicated by
the fact that rule suspensions can arise under various circumstances.
The rule in question may have been in effect for some time, or it may not
yet be effective. Moreover, the suspension may be motivated by a variety
of factors, including the discovery of new information, the discovery of
unintended consequences, changed economic or societal circumstances,
or a major policy shift. Reported case law traditionally has provided
agency attorneys with little guidance in this area. The uncertaintysurrounding rule suspensions took on added significance, however, with the
election of PresidentReagan. One of President Reagan'sfirst acts was
to suspend numerous rules pendingfurther consideration of their costs
and benefits. As a result, many controversial suspensions have taken
place, and considerable litigation has ensued. This litigation, in turn,
has provided agency attorneys with some answers.
In this Article ProfessorHolmes analyzes the cases that have dealt
with agency suspensions offinal rules, considering both proceduraland
substantive challenges to the suspensions. The discussion includes an
analysis of the Supreme Court's one decision that impacts on this areaa decision having serious implicationsfor the judicial review of agency
rule suspensions. Professor Holmes concludes by suggesting a framework forjudicialreview of both proceduraland substantive challenges to
suspensions. The suggested framework identifies those factors that
should be considered in determining the level of review under which a
suspension should be scrutinized.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A little drama is played out with some regularity within the corridors of a
typical federal regulatory agency. An agency official asks the agency attorney
about the possibility of suspending an agency rule. The agency typically has
complied with the requirements of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) 1 for informal rulemaking: publishing a Federal Register notice of the
proposed rulemaking, providing the public an opportunity to submit written
comments, and publishing the final rule in the Fedei al Register accompanied by
t Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College. B.S. 1970, Duke; M.S. 1971,
Michigan; J.D. 1975, Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistence of Eileen Mikalonis and the institutional support toward completion of this Article provided- by Western
New England College School of Law.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
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a "concise general statement" of the rule's basis and purpose. 2 The rule may be

longstanding or it may not yet be in effect. 3 The suspension may be motivated
by the discovery that the rule has unintended consequences, by the development

of new information affecting the factual underpinnings of the rule, by changed
economic or social circumstances, or by a major shift in agency policy.

Until recently the agency attorney considering the legality of suspending a
rule could find little or no guidance in reported case law.4 Especially if the rule
had not yet become effective, the attorney might argue that the agency retained
equitable power to suspend its own rules summarily, distinguishing temporary
suspensions from permanent revocations. Or the attorney might answer conservatively that the agency could suspend a rule only after complying with the
same procedural and substantive requirements as applied to the initial promulgation of the rule. Finally, the attorney might provide a response based on a

practical judgment about whether the suspension would be sufficiently contro5
versial to prompt a court challenge.
The small amount of litigation over this issue may indicate that in the past
agency attorneys generally took a conservative view of the agency's power to

suspend rules; more likely, however, it indicates the uncontroversial nature of
most suspensions. That situation changed dramatically with the election of
Ronald Reagan. One of President Reagan's first acts in office was to order agencies in the executive branch, "to the extent permitted by law," 6 to suspend for

sixty days all regulations promulgated in final form that would otherwise become effective during that sixty-day period. 7 More permanent measures to require the reassessment of existing regulations soon followed in Executive Order
12,291,8 which directed the suspension of "major rules" that had not yet become
effective to the extent necessary to permit reconsideration of their costs and
benefits. 9

2. Id. § 553(b)-(c). The agency also may hold an informal public hearing at which oral
presentations are made; such hearings may be required by the agency's enabling act or they may be
conducted voluntarily by the agency. Formal rulemaking requires also that the rule be made on a
formal record after an opportunity for a trial-type adjudicatory hearing. Id. § 553(c); see also id.
§§ 556-557 (elaborating on the procedures for formal rulemaking). The Supreme Court drastically
restricted the coverage of the APA's provision for formal rulemaking in United States v. Florida
East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). This Article considers only informal rulemaking, which includes most substantive rules. See 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:1, at 450 (2d
ed. 1978).
3. The Administrative Procedure Act, subject to enumerated exceptions, requires that a substantive rule be published at least 30 days before its effective date. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1982).
4. Some earlier cases refer to agency suspensions without notice and comment in describing
the regulatory history of a current dispute, but in none of those cases were the suspensions an issue
before the court. See, eg., Paccar, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632,
636-39 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Kennedy,
572 F.2d 377, 383 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978).
5. When the author worked in the Office of the General Counsel at the Environmental Protection Agency, this last notion was referred to as the "Bob Zener no plaintiff rule" in honor of a former
General Counsel.
6. Presidential Memorandum of January 29, 1981, 3 C.F.R. 223 (1981).
7. Id.
8. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34 (1982).
9. A "major rule" was defined by § l(b) of the Order as a regulation likely to have an annual
economic effect of at least $100 million, cause "[a] major increase in costs or prices," or have
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As a result of the Reagan Administration's emphasis on deregulation,
agency suspensions have not been limited to uncontroversial rules, and litigation
has ensued over agency power to suspend promulgated rules. Although the
Supreme Court has not yet decided a suspension case, its decision in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 10
involving the Department of Transportation's rescission of its "passive restraint" rule, has significant implications for the proper scope of judicial review
of both the procedural and substantive issues arising out of agency suspensions.
Thus, the litigation spawned by Executive Order 12,291 has provided at least
some answers for agency attorneys.
This Article analyzes the cases involving agency suspensions of final rules.
It first looks to dispositions of procedural challenges to the suspensions and then
considers dispositions of substantive challenges. The discussion includes State
Farm's implications for judicial review of agency suspensions. The Article concludes with a suggested framework for judicial review of both the procedural
and substantive aspects of agency suspensions.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDING PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES TO
AGENCY SUSPENSIONS

A.

The Early Cases-RejectingProceduralChallenges

In early cases courts searched for a way to decide whether an agency's action in suspending a rule itself constituted rulemaking subject to the APA's requirements of prior notice and opportunity for comment. The decisions contain
some confusion but conclude that, in most instances, suspensions properly are
classified as rulemakings that require prior opportunity for public comment except in compelling situations.
One of the earliest cases, Public Citizen v. Department of Health and
Human Services,1 1 dramatically shows a court's failure to resolve adequately the
issues presented by an agency's summary suspension of a promulgated rule. In
1980 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) established by regulation 12 an
experimental program to provide patients with information concerning possible
"[s]ignificant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation," or
the ability of American companies to compete with foreign-based companies. Exec. Order No.
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127-28 (1981). Sections 7(a) and 8(a) required that agencies "suspend or
postpone" the effective date of each major rule promulgated in final form but not yet effective as of
the date of the Order, excluding major rules that could not "legally be postponed or suspended,"
that for good cause should become effective without reconsideration of their costs and benefits, that
responded to an emergency, or whose reconsideration would conflict with statutory or judicial deadlines. Id. at 131-32. Section 3 directed federal agencies to prepare and submit to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget a Regulatory Impact Analysis for each major rule. Id. at 128-30.
This Regulatory Impact Analysis implemented the requirements of § 2 that "to the extent permitted
by law" regulatory action be taken only when the potential benefits to society outweigh the potential
costs and when the regulatory approach chosen involves the least net cost to society. Id. at 128.
10. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
11. No. 81-0820 (D.D.C. July 31, 1981) (mem.), aff'd, 671 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
12. 21 C.F.R. § 203 (1981). For background on this promulgation, see 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754
(1980).
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side effects and other important information about ten widely used prescription
drugs. The regulation required the distribution of "patient package inserts"
containing such information with those drugs. The regulation was not self-executing, but provided that 180 days after the FDA published a notice in the Federal Register manufacturers and distributors were required to provide inserts for
each specified drug. 13 In the final days of the Carter Administration, the FDA
published notices for five drugs.14
On February 20, 1981, one month after President Reagan's inauguration,
the FDA announced to the trade press that it intended to suspend implementa15
tion of the insert program, both in general and as it applied to those five drugs.
Not until April 28, however, did the FDA formally announce in the Federal
Register a suspension, or a "stay" as the FDA termed it, of the insert program. 16 That announcement did not solicit public comment, explain the
agency's failure to provide an opportunity for comment, or provide any expiration date for the suspension.17
Public Citizen, a consumer interest group, challenged the FDA's action,
but District Court Judge June L. Green dismissed the complaint.18 Judge Green
distinguished a "temporary stay" from an "indefinite suspension," apparently in
the belief that only an indefinite suspension was subject to the APA's notice-andcomment requirements for rulemaking. 19 Based largely on the agency's assertion that it contemplated only a "temporary stay" to allow newly-appointed
FDA Commissioner Arthur Hayes, Jr., to review the insert program, Judge
20
Green characterized the agency's action as a temporary one.
The remaining issue for Judge Green was how long a stay could remain in
effect and still be deemed "temporary." She found "dispositive" the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's decision in Council of the
Southern Mountains v. Donovan,2 1 which upheld a six-month suspension. Judge
Green thus determined six months to be sufficient time to allow the FDA to
consider the insert program and invited a motion to reopen the case should the
13. 21 C.F.R. § 203 (1981).
14. See 45 Fed. Reg. 78,514 (1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 28 (1981) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 203.31
(1981)). The FDA previously had required inserts for five other drugs and devices, and its authority
to do so for one of these five, estrogen, was upheld in Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Food and Drug
Admin., 634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
15. See Public Citizen v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 671 F.2d 518, 519 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
16. 46 Fed. Reg. 23,739 (1981). Agencies may designate their action a suspension, stay, deferral, postponement, or use some similar term. See, eg., 45 Fed. Reg. 80,501, 80,501 (1980) ("defer");
46 Fed. Reg. 55,679, 55,679 (1981) ("postpone"); 46 Fed. Reg. 51,407, 51,407 (1981) ("suspend");
47 Fed. Reg. 7841, 7841 (1982) ("delay"). The different terms do not reflect any apparent substantive differences. See 47 Fed. Reg. 4518, 4518-20 (1982) (Environmental Protection Agency using
"postponement" and "deferral" interchangeably). This Article generally refers to such an action as

a suspension.
17. See 46 Fed. Reg. 23,739 (1981).
18. Public Citizen, No. 81-0820, slip op. at 3.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
21. 653 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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22
stay extend beyond six months.

Implicit in Judge Green's decision is the notion that actions to suspend or
stay agency rules-at least those actions characterized as "temporary"-are subject to different procedural requirements than are actions to revoke agency rules.
Thus, Judge Green stated her expectation "that the defendant will act to continue the program [after completing its review] but if the defendant decides to
abandon [the program] then the panoply of measures called for by the APA
must be instituted. '23 The court advanced no justification for this distinction,
but appeared to regard the agency as retaining some equitable power over a
regulation that had not yet become effective.
Judge Green's decision and its curt, per curiam affirmance by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia24 are poorly reasoned and
without support. Only Judge Edwards' dissent from the court of appeals' affirmance clearly perceived the need to subject the FDA action to the procedural
requirements of the APA.25 As Judge Edwards pointed out, the Southern
Mountains decision actually should have foreclosed any FDA claim that (1) its
action was a temporary maintenance of the status quo and not a "rule" subject
to the APA's rulemaking requirements, 26 or (2) that the FDA had good cause to
suspend the regulations without notice-and-comment rulemaking. 27 At issue in
Southern Mountains was the Mine Safety and Health Administration's (MSHA)
six-month suspension of its regulations requiring coal operators to provide underground miners with safety equipment that would provide oxygen in case of a
mine explosion or fire. 28 The Southern Mountains court upheld the agency suspension, 2 9 but for reasons that clearly are inapposite to the Public Citizen
suspension.
Unlike the FDA suspension of the patient package insert program, the
MSHA suspension was limited explicitly to six months. 30 Although both suspensions were imposed without advance notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
MSHA suspension notice expressly incorporated a statement of the agency's reasons for finding such rulemaking "impracticable" and "contrary to the public
interest."' 3 1 If the agency suspension is a substantive "rule" under the APA,
then the APA requires advance notice and opportunity for comment, or the
inclusion in the suspension notice of a statement of good cause justifying the
22. See Public Citizen, Civil Action No. 81-0820, slip op. at 3. In fact, the FDA proposed on
February 17, 1982, to abolish the PPI program, see 47 Fed. Reg. 7200 (1982) (proposed Feb. 17,
1982), and promulgated a final rule abolishing the program on August 16, 1982, see 47 Fed. Reg.
39,147 (1982). Thus, the stay continued in effect for more than 16 months.
23. Public Citizen, No. 81-0820, slip op. at 3.
24. Public Citizen, 671 F.2d at 518.
25. Id. at 519-20 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 520 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
27. Id.

28. Southern Mountains, 653 F.2d at 575.
29. Id.

30. 45 Fed. Reg. 80,501, 80,501 (1980).
31. Id. at 80,502.
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failure to provide for prior notice and comment.3 2 Although the government
conceded that the MSHA suspension was a substantive rule, the American Mining Congress, an industry association intervenor, argued that the suspension order was an "interpretative rule" not subject to notice-and-comment
requirements. The court rejected this claim on the ground that the order had
"palpable effects" on the rights of affected parties. 33
The justification presented by the MSHA was far more compelling than
that offered by the FDA in Public Citizen. The MSHA's six-month suspension
of coal operators' duties to provide underground miners with safety devices
arose from the agency's inability to complete field testing of the devices within
the time period it originally contemplated and the availability of only a few of
the devices.3 4 The court in Southern Mountains stressed that these problems
were due to circumstances beyond the agency's control and that the agency had
made a good faith effort to resolve them.3 5 Although the suspension delayed the
use of potentially life-saving devices, an apparently genuine safety concern about
the chemical agent used in some of these devices had been raised by a joint
committee representing both the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association and
the United Mine Workers of America. These concerns led to the delay in field
testing.3 6 In contrast, the FDA's suspension of the patient package insert program apparently was due not to circumstances beyond the agency's control, but
to circumstances entirely within its control-the appointment of a new FDA
Commissioner who wished to reassess the entire program from his own policy
perspective. This reassessment was not prompted by health or safety concerns,
but by less compelling concerns over "the cost, necessity, and utility" of the
program and by the "spirit" of cost-benefit reassessment embodied in Executive
Order 12,291. 37 Furthermore, far from acting as diligently as possible, the FDA
ordered the suspension more than two months after it informally announced
38
through the trade press its intention to suspend the program.
One final factor, unstated by the Southern Mountains court but alluded to
by Judge Edward's dissent in Public Citizen,3 9 further distinguishes the two
cases. The MSHA engaged in continuing discussions with representatives of the
major coal operators, the major mine workers union, and the manufacturers of
safety devices in attempting to implement the regulation in question.4°
Although it is not clear that the agency in these discussions suggested or sought
32. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982).
33. Southern Mountains, 653 F.2d at 580 n.28 (quoting National Helium Corp. v. Federal Energy Admin., 569 F.2d 1137, 1146 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977)). The "palpable effects" test and
the "binding norm" test are the two tests most frequently used to distinguish substantive rules,
which are subject to notice-and-comment procedures, from statements of policy, which are exempt
from those procedures. See infra text accompanying notes 271-73.
34. See 45 Fed. Reg. 80,501-02 (1980).
35. Southern Mountains, 653 F.2d at 581.
36. Id. at 577.
37. 46 Fed. Reg. 23,739, 23,739 (1981).
38. Public Citizen, 671 F.2d at 519.
39. Id. at 520 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
40. Southern Mountains, 653 F.2d at 577-79.
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comment on the possibility of a short-term suspension, it had at least discussed
with the major parties affected by the regulation the difficulties that led to the
suspension. In contrast, the only FDA discussion in the Public Citizen case involved a meeting with a pharmaceutical industry representative in which the
FDA may have informally solicited comment on its suspension.4 1 If a court's
aversion to sanctioning a suspension-or other rulemaking action-without advance notice and comment is caused by a concern that the agency's action is
taken without hearing the views of the various interest groups affected, informal
discussion between the agency and representatives of those affected interest
groups prior to the suspension mitigates the court's concerns to some degree.
Even with all the factors supporting the MSHA suspension, however, the Southern Mountains court still viewed it as "an extremely close case." 42 The absence
of those same factors should have led the court in Public Citizen to reverse the
FDA's suspension on procedural grounds.
43
Another early case, NationalFederationof FederalEmployees v. Devine,
rejected a procedural challenge to an agency suspension for reasons comparable
to those in Southern Mountains. The Devine case involved the suspension or
"postponement" by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) of the 1981
"open season," which allowed federal employees to switch freely from one
health plan to another. The OPM regulations then in effect required the government to hold the open season annually for a one-month period beginning Monday of the second full work week in November. 44 On Friday, November 6,
1981, OPM issued a bulletin which postponed that year's open season, due to
begin the following Monday, for an indefinite period extending up to the scheduled time for the 1982 open season.45 This postponement was followed a few
days later by an "interim regulation," effective immediately, which authorized
the Director of OPM to cancel or reschedule the annual open season by issuing a
46
bulletin to that effect.
OPM apparently did not dispute that its suspension of the open season was
a rulemaking subject to the requirements of the APA; instead, the procedural
issue presented to the court was whether OPM had "good cause" under APA
section 553(b)(B) 47 to suspend the 1981 open season without prior notice and
comment. 48 The Devine court found sufficient similarity between OPM's suspension of the open season and the MSHA's suspension of the mine safety regulations in Southern Mountains to find good cause to dispense with notice and
comment. 49
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
(1981).
47.
48.
49.

Public Citizen, 671 F.2d at 520 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
Southern Mountains, 653 F.2d at 582.
671 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
5 C.F.R. § 890.301(d) (1981).
Devine, 671 F.2d at 609.
5 C.F.R. § 890.301(d) (1982). For background on this interim rule, see 46 Fed. Reg. 55,679
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982).
Devine, 671 F.2d at 610.
Id. at 612.
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Just as the Southern Mountains court found that the unavailability of mine
safety devices provided good cause for the MSHA's regulatory suspension without notice and comment, the Devine court found that the unavailability of accurate information about 1982 health benefit contracts provided OPM with good
cause to postpone the 1981 open season without notice and comment.5 0 Proceeding without the benefit of accurate health plan information might well have
frustrated the very purpose of the open season, which was to allow informed
employee choice from among competing health plans.5 1 Moreover, it might
have damaged the financial stability of the entire program. Blue Cross-Blue
Shield, to which about half of the enrolled federal employees subscribed, had
suffered such substantial financial losses during 198152 that it planned to withdraw from the program unless the open season was postponed until it could
solve its actuarial problems.5 3 The court attributed these problems to circumstances beyond the agency's control 54 and viewed the agency's actions as good
faith efforts to resolve those problems. Finally, the time limitation in the suspension aided the court's characterization of the agency's action as a limited and
measured response to an "emergency," which was within the good cause exception of the APA.5 5
These early cases apparently relied heavily on the agency's characterization
of its action in determining the procedural requirements applicable to that action. The decisions do not discuss in any meaningful way the extent to which
suspensions differ from other agency actions nor whether those differences affect
the applicable procedural requirements. Subsequent cases, however, began to
analyze these issues.
B.

The Later Cases-UpholdingProceduralChallenges

As the courts gained more experience with procedural challenges to agency
suspensions of promulgated rules, they more clearly declared that such suspensions constituted rulemaking which, absent good cause, required opportunity for
public comment. Moreover, these later cases also interpreted the good cause
exception more narrowly than did the earlier cases.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency 56 (NRDC) was the first case upholding a procedural challenge to an

Id.

50. Id. at 611.
51. Id.
52. Blue Cross-Blue Shield lost $200 million during 1981, "thereby exhausting its reserves."

53. Id.
54. Id. The unavailability of accurate information about 1982 health benefit plans was due in
part to ongoing litigation over an OPM-ordered reduction in benefits. Id. at 609-10.
55. Id. at 612. The court conditioned its finding that the interim regulations, which provided
legal authority for the continued postponement of the 1982 open season, had been published validly
for good cause without notice and comment on the "expeditious" completion in "good faith" of
notice-and-comment rulemaking to provide such authority on a more permanent basis. Id. at 613.
OPM had begun such a rulemaking with a hearing proposal published on February 11, 1982. See 47
Fed. Reg. 6283 (1982).
56. 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on other groundssub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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agency decision to suspend its regulations without notice-and-comment
rulemaking. It is also the only suspension case decided outside the District of
Columbia Circuit. In NRDC the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit invalidated the suspension by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) of the effective date of a set of amendments to its general "pretreatment"
57
regulations under the Clean Water Act.

The Clean Water Act mandates that the EPA promulgate regulations re-

quiring that industrial facilities pretreat their wastes before discharging them

into publicly owned treatment works. 5 8 General pretreatment standards applied
to all industrial users of publicly owned treatment works, 59 whereas categorical
pretreatment standards provided additional requirements applicable only to
specified industries. 60 After a troubled start 61 the EPA promulgated general

pretreatment regulations in 1978,62 which it amended in one of the "midnight
63

regulations" promulgated during the last days of the Carter Administration.
The amendments were short-lived. On March 27, 1981, the EPA indefinitely
suspended the effective date of the pretreatment amendments, 64 curtly citing as

its sole reason Executive Order 12,291.65 On October 5, 1981, after the NRDC
had filed suit seeking review of the indefinite suspension, the EPA terminated
the suspension 66 and conducted a notice-and-comment rulemaking to further
suspend indefinitely the effective date of four of the general pretreatment amendments, pending continued study by the EPA. 67 The suspension was particularly
significant for a class of industry known as integrated electroplating facilities,

because it postponed entirely their duty to comply with the electroplating pretreatment standards.

68

57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
58. Id. § 1317(b)(1). The pretreatment standards are intended to "prevent the discharge of any
pollutant through treatment works... which are publicly owned, which pollutant interferes with,
passes through, or otherwise is incompatible with such works." Id.
59. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.1(b) (1986).
60. See, eg., id. § 406.
61. The deadline for proposing the standards was within 180 days of the Act's effective date of
October 18, 1972, and the deadline for promulgating final standards was 90 days after publication of
the proposal. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). The EPA finally published the general pretreatment regulations as part of a consent decree entered into with the Natural Resources Defense Council. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833, 1834
(D.D.C. March 9, 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2120, 2122-23 (D.D.C. June 8, 1976).
62. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,736 (1978) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. § 403 (1986)).
63. See 46 Fed. Reg. 94.04 (1981); see also Presidential Memorandum of January 29, 1981, 3
C.F.R. 223 (1981) (postponing pending regulations).
64. The order was signed by EPA's Acting Administrator on March 27, 1981, and published in
the April 2, 1981, Federal Register. See 46 Fed. Reg. 19,936 (1981). Under the Clean Water Act
pretreatment standards must require compliance within three years from their date of promulgation.
33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). The 1981 amendments had specified an effective date of March 13,
1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 9404, 9404 (1981). The effective date already had been postponed from March
13 to March 30, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,972, 11,972 (1981), but that postponement was never
challenged.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
66. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,502 (1981).
67. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,503 (1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 4518 (1982).
68. "Integrated" electroplating facilities are those that combine wastestreans from electroplating operations with other process wastestreams before treatment. 40 C.F.R. § 413.02(h) (1986). The
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In NRDC the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
that the indefinite suspension constituted rulemaking under the APA for three
reasons. The first reason was formalistic. The APA defines a "rule" as "an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and of future effect." '69
Without any effective date, the court reasoned, no agency statement could have
"future effect"; therefore, the effective date must itself be an integral part of the
rule. 70 Because the APA expressly provides that the repeal of a rule itself constitutes rulemaking, 7 1 and because indefinite suspension of an effective date essentially constitutes repeal of the rule, the court classified indefinite suspensions
72
as rules that are subject to the APA's procedural requirements.
The second reason was based on the EPA's own characterization of its ac-

tion. The court found it significant that the EPA treated its action of October
13, 1981-proposing further suspension of the effective date of the regulations-

as an action subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. 73 However, the court
was wrong if it meant that it should defer to an agency's interpretation of

whether a suspension is subject to APA rulemaking requirements. The agency's
characterization of the legal effect of its action is an important consideration in

determining the nature of the action, but once that effect is determined, the applicability of APA rulemaking procedures is an issue ultimately for the court to

decide, not the agency. 74

Of course, the court may not have meant to imply that this was a question

of deference to agency interpretation. The EPA's October 1981 rulemaking to
consider continuing the suspension, which followed the NRDC's filing of a peti-

tion challenging the initial suspension, was a transparent attempt to present the

EPA in a better light before the court and possibly to make the case moot.7 5

The court simply may have been displaying its disapproval of the EPA's attempt
76
to escape judicial review.

EPA had promulgated electroplating pretreatment standards in 1979, but those standards were challenged in court by Ford Motor Company and two industry associations. As part of a settlement
agreement, the EPA agreed to suspend the applicability of the electroplating standards to integrated
facilities until final promulgation of a regulation establishing a formula for calculating pollutant
limits at facilities that combine several wastestreams prior to treatment. 46 Fed. Reg. 9404, 9405
(1981). This "combined wastestreamn formula" was one of the provisions promulgated by the Carter
Administration in the 1981 amendments. Id.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982).
70. NRDC, 683 F.2d at 761-62.
71. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1982).
72. NRDC, 683 F.2d at 762, 763 n.23.

73. Id.
74. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942) (noting that the
substance of the agency action, not the label used by the agency, is decisive); American Bus Ass'n v.
United States, 627 F.2d 525, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (giving consideration to an agency's determination that its statement was binding to bolster the court's conclusion that the statement constituted a
rule); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting
that the agency's characterization of its action often gives "some indication" of the action's nature).
75. The court rejected the mootness argument raised by the EPA and industry. NRDC, 683
F.2d at 758-59; cf Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1422, 1431-33 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (claim alleging impropriety of suspension without notice and comment rendered moot by
subsequent procedurally correct promulgation of a superseding rule).
76. See, e.g., NRDC, 683 F.2d at 768 (rejecting post-promulgation notice-and-comment procedures as a substitute for prepromulgation notice and comment).
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The court's third reason was a functional one. Citing Southern Mountains
with approval, the NRDC court found that the indefinite suspension of the effective date had "palpable effects" on both the regulated industry and the public,
facilities to comply
especially in postponing the duty of integrated electroplating
77
standards.
pretreatment
electroplating
the
with
Having determined that the indefinite suspension constituted rulemaking,
the court held that the EPA lacked good cause for its failure to comply with the
APA's notice-and-comment requirements. 78 The EPA's sole reason for summarily suspending the pretreatment regulations was Executive Order 12,291, yet
the agency provided no reason why it could not comply both with that order and
79
The
with the APA by means of a relatively brief public comment period.
court-ordered remedy for the agency's violation of the APA was to void the
suspension, reinstating all the pretreatment amendments with their original effective date of March 30, 1981.80 The opportunity for notice and comment on
the question whether the suspension should be continued could not cure the
procedural defects of the EPA's summary decision to suspend in the first into accept such a procedure would allow agenstance; the court recognized that
8
cies to circumvent the APA. '
The court's decision clearly was correct. The EPA's suspension affected
regulated industries and the public in a manner comparable to that of a typical
rulemaking. The suspension relieved integrated electroplating facilities of their
obligation to comply with the categorical pretreatment standards within three
years of the effective date of the 1981 regulations.8 2 Moreover, the suspension of
the 1981 amendments to the general pretreatment regulation left the 1978 version of those regulations in effect. Ironically, the suspended 1981 amendments
83
Thus,
for the most part liberalized the requirements of the 1978 regulations.
the EPA could not legitimately claim that an immediate suspension, without
public comment, was necessary to avoid imposing costly compliance burdens on
industry, because the 1978 pretreatment regulations reinstated by the suspension
imposed even costlier burdens.8 4 That many of the comments submitted on the
77. Id. at 762-63; see supra note 68; cf. Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 711 F.2d 370, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (interim rule that indefinitely suspended a compliance
deadline for licensed nuclear facilities altered a binding norm and thus was a substantive rule, not a
procedural rule or statement of policy).
78. NRDC, 683 F.2d at 767.
79. Id. at 766; cf. Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d 370,
382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (inability to promulgate a rule on time due to agency's lack of diligence does
not constitute good cause).
80. NRDC, 683 F.2d at 768.
81. Id.
82. This deadline (May 12, 1983) was later extended to January 28, 1984. 46 Fed. Reg. 43,972
(1981); see infra text accompanying notes 272-73 (discussing the "palpable effects" test).
83. 47 Fed. Reg. 4518, 4519-20 (1982).
84. The EPA might have argued that the 1981 amendments for the first time imposed categorical pretreatment standards on integrated electroplating facilities. Because the deadline for compliance with those standards was three years away, however, the EPA could not justify the need to
suspend those standards without public comment. Courts generally refuse to find that an express
deadline justifies an exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking when the agency knew of the
deadline in sufficient time to use normal rulemaking procedures. Note, The Administrative Procedure Act's Notice and Comment Requirements: "Good Cause"for FurtherDelay in the Implementa-
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rulemaking which considered whether to continue the suspension noted the benefits of allowing some of the 1981 amendments to take effect 85 demonstrates the
value of the public comment process, even with respect to agency decisions to
suspend rules.
Another aspect of the NRDC court's rationale is particularly significant. In
discussing the appropriate standard of substantive review, the court cited the
statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
State Farm that "sharp changes of agency course constitute 'danger signals' to
which a reviewing court must be alert."' 86 The court then expanded this notion
to include procedural review: "As with substantive review, however, it makes
sense to scrutinize the procedures employed by the agency all the more closely
where the agency has acted, within a compressed time frame, to reverse itself by
the procedure under challenge."'87 Thus, for the first time, a court explicitly
made the reversal of direction represented by a suspension a factor in the scope
of its review.
EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Gorsuch8 8 overturned another EPA regulatory suspension, this time involving the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA). 89 The RCRA required the EPA, among other duties, to promulgate standards for facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste. 90
Although the RCRA required the EPA to promulgate these standards by April
1978, 9 1 the agency did not promulgate its first standards until 1980, pursuant to
a district court order entered in a citizen's suit brought by the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) and other plaintiffs. 92 Those standards constituted "Phase
I" of a two phase promulgation process. The Phase I regulations established the
basic regulatory structure for hazardous waste facilities, but left establishment of
technical performance standards to "Phase II." The Phase I regulations required hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facilities to submit Part
A of a permit application, providing the EPA with basic information about the
facility, 93 in order to continue operation legally under "interim status."' 94 Submission of Part B of the permit application, which provided the far more delion of the CleanAirAct?, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L.R.. 549, 579-83 (1981). A three-year period clearly
would permit the completion of public comment procedures. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 568 F.2d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 1977) (agency that had known of its
duty under court order to promulgate regulations for two and one-half years failed to justify
rulemaking without prior notice-and-comment procedure).
85. 47 Fed. Reg. 4518, 4519-20 (1982).
86. NRDC, 683 F.2d at 760 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transportation, 680 F.2d 206, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacatedon othergrounds sub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)).
87. Id.
88. 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
89.
90.
91.
92.

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
Id. § 6924.
Id.
Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1981); Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas.

(BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 1979).
93. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 806.
94. Interim status was authorized by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-580, § 3005(e), 90 Stat. 2795, 2809 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1982)).
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tailed information necessary to actually issue or deny a permit, was not required
until issuance of the Phase II standards. 95 Those standards were issued in January 1981, to become effective in July 1981.96
On June 26, 1981, the EPA Administrator wrote to the Office of Management and Budget concerning the effect of Executive Order 12,29197 on the January RCRA standards. 98 The EPA had begun preparing a regulatory impact
analysis of the standards, as required by the Executive Order, but found good
cause to allow the standards to go into effect prior to the completion of that
analysis. 99 The agency decided instead to publish a Federal Register notice proposing to suspend or withdraw the January standards for existing 1°° storage
surface impoundments and incinerators and to publish a notice that the EPA
would not call in Part B permit applications for those facilities until the agency
had evaluated the public comments on the proposed suspension.101 Four
months later the EPA published its proposal to suspend the effective date of the
January standards for existing surface impoundments and incinerators pending
EPA's reexamination of those standards. 10 2 The EPA proposed the suspension
because the regulated community had criticized the standards for existing facilities as being too costly.10

3

In the same notice, the agency announced a new

interim "policy," effective immediately, not to call in Part B permit applications
for existing surface impoundments and incinerators until it made a final decision
on the proposed suspension. 10 4 The EPA justified this interim policy as a "prudent allocation of resources"; given the thousands of hazardous waste facilities
needing permits, the EPA asserted that it should not begin processing permits
10 5
under standards whose effective date it might soon suspend.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
with EDF's claim that this EPA policy constituted rulemaking in violation of
the APA's requirement for prior notice and an opportunity for public com95. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 806.
96. 46 Fed. Reg. 2802 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 7666 (1981). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requires that these standards take effect six months after the date of promulgation. 42
U.S.C. § 6930(b) (1982).
97. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34
(1982). For a discussion of Executive Order 12,291, see supra text accompanying note 8.
98. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,318, 38,318-19 (1981).
99. Id. at 38,318.
100. The EPA distinguished the standards for new facilities on the grounds that a suspension of
those standards would delay the operation of new facilities and the standards for new facilities had
not been subject to significant industry criticism. Id. at 38,318-19.
101. Id. at 38,319. The EPA also decided to file a motion with the district court in Illinois v.
Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 1979), requesting an extension of the deadline for promulgating standards for these facilities. The EPA feared that the court might view a
suspension as a violation of its order. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,318, 38,318 n.3, 38,319 n.4 (June 26, 1981);
see supra text accompanying note 92. The district court eventually held that the suspension did not
violate its order. Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340, 341 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 51,407, 51,407 (1981).
103. Id. at 51,408.
104. Id. at 51,409. The EPA announced that it would process Part B permit applications voluntarily submitted by these facilities. Id.
105. Id.
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ment. 10 6 In some respects, the situation in Gorsuch was much like the one
presented in NRDC. As in NRDC, the EPA effectively conceded that a suspension of regulations constituted rulemaking. This concession is apparent both
from the fact the EPA conducted a rulemaking on its proposal to suspend the
effective date of the January standards 10 7 and from the fact the letter from the
EPA Administrator to the Office of Management and Budget concluded as

much. 108
The EPA again attempted-and again unsuccessfully-to render the plaintiff's claim moot. 10 9 Less than one month after oral argument before the court
of appeals, the EPA withdrew its proposal to suspend and ended its interim
policy for hazardous waste incinerators. 110 Two months after oral argument the
agency promulgated new standards for storage impoundments and withdrew its
interim permit policy for those facilities."'
The issue in Gorsuch arose in the context of an RCRA program that, much
like the pretreatment program in NRDC, had a troubled history.1 2 In the prior
two years the EPA by its own count had amended or suspended RCRA regulations or had extended compliance deadlines thirty-nine times." 3 The EPA's
performance thus generated little sympathy, and the court in Gorsuch readily
relied on both NRDC and Southern Mountains for the principle that an agency
suspension of a promulgated regulation "normally" constitutes rulemaking sub4
ject to APA rulemaking requirements. 1"
There is, however, an important difference between NRDC and Gorsuch. In
Gorsuch the EPA had published a notice of its proposed suspension and had
offered the public an opportunity to comment on that proposal. The EPA had
suspended without prior notice and comment the duty of the two classes of hazardous waste facilities to submit Part B permit applications, but the agency characterized that action as a statement of agency policy, not as a substantive
rule.' 5 The APA expressly exempts statements of policy from notice-and-com6
ment rulemaking requirements."
The distinction between a substantive rule and a general statement of
agency policy is a difficult one to draw. 117 The substance of what the agency has
done rather than the agency's own characterization of its action is conclusive.18
The agency's characterization, however, may provide some evidence of the na106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 816, 818.
46 Fed. Reg. 51,407, 51,407 (1981).
Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 808 n.Il (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 38,318, 38,319 n.4 (1981)).
The court of appeals rejected the EPA's mootness claim. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 810-11.
47 Fed. Reg. 27,516, 27,516 (1982).
47 Fed. Reg. 32,274, 32,318 (1982).
See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 811 n.20 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 32,274, 32,276-77 (1982)).
Id. at 815-16.
46 Fed. Reg. 51,407, 51,409 (1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 27,516, 27,516 (1982).

116. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982).
117. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:5, at 32.
118. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942).
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ture of the action. 119 The court in Gorsuch drew on its earlier decision in American Bus Association v. United States 120 to classify the EPA's policy statement as
a rule because it had the same substantive effect on the duties of hazardous waste
facilities as would a formal regulatory suspension. 121
Not only was the court's decision in Gorsuch correct, but its approach was
particularly incisive. The EPA's action in suspending the duty of two classes of
hazardous waste facilities to submit Part B applications in reality relieved those
facilities of any obligation under the January standards. This action allowed
these facilities to continue operating under interim status and indefinitely postponed the permit process. The only difference between the EPA's action and a
formal suspension is that the owner or operator of one of these facilities still
could voluntarily submit a Part B application asserting compliance with the January standards and requesting issuance of a final RCRA permit. Voluntary submissions under standards that the EPA proposed to suspend and ultimately
liberalize would seem highly unlikely, however, as the agency apparently conceded. 122 Moreover, the court adopted the view of NRDC 123 that the agency's
reversal of its prior course of action, in this case embodied in the January standards, necessitated stricter judicial scrutiny of both the procedural and substantive aspects of the agency's decision. 124 The agency itself, perhaps unwittingly,
illustrated the value of this stricter scrutiny and the potential value of an opportunity for public comment on the EPA's decision. The EPA eventually agreed
with comments, submitted on the proposed suspension for hazardous waste incinerators, which claimed that industry's criticisms of the cost imposed by those
125
standards were not adequately supported.
The one troubling aspect of Gorsuch is the court's statement that "an
agency action which has the effect of suspending a duly promulgated regulation
is normally subject to APA rulemaking requirements." 126 If the court meant
that such actions are subject to rulemaking requirements absent good cause, the
statement is unobjectionable;1 27 however, if the court meant that some catego119. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
120. 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
121. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 816-17.
122. Id. at 814 n.26.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
124. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 817.
125. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,516, 27,518 (1982). The EPA notice proposing to suspend the January
standards and announcing the agency's interim policy indicated that industry criticism of the costs
imposed prompted the EPA's interim policy action. 46 Fed. Reg. 51,407, 51,408 (1981). Yet the
EPA had also stated that it had "not had an opportunity to assess the merits of these assertions in
detail." Id. Notice and comment prior to the EPA's interim permit policy would have provided all
interested parties, not just industry, with an opportunity to comment on the merits of industry's
assertions or the desirability of suspending the permit process pending further evaluation of those
assertions. Cf. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d
425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (striking down the agency's revocation of a promulgated rule without
notice and comment), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council,
463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
126. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d at 816 (emphasis added).
127. The court noted that the EPA did not assert a good cause exception. Id. at 816 n.27.
Because the EPA's letter to the Office of Management and Budget, announcing the EPA's intention
to publish an interim permit policy, was written four months before the EPA published its Federal
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ries of agency suspensions do not even qualify as rulemakings, then the statement is incorrect.128
Decided in 1983, EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. EnvironmentalProtection
Agency 129 (EDF)involved yet another EPA suspension under the RCRA. EPA
regulations required submission of several types of reports, including annual reports by hazardous waste generators and waste treatment and disposal facilities;
quarterly groundwater monitoring reports by treatment and disposal facilities;
and groundwater quality assessment outlines by treatment and disposal facilities.130 In January 1981 the EPA permanently suspended the annual report requirement for 1980 on the ground that the agency's workload prevented it from
analyzing the reports adequately. 1 3 1 In February 1982 the EPA suspended the
compliance deadline for all three reporting requirements until August 1,
1982.132 The agency's notice asserted good cause to suspend compliance immediately without notice and comment. The agency argued that because it would
be proposing substantial changes to the reporting requirements, immediate action was essential to avoid imposing unnecessary costs on regulated facilities. 133
EDF filed a petition for review of the EPA's decision to suspend the reporting requirements without notice and comment. In what had become a familiar
EPA litigation tactic, 134 the agency reinstated all three requirements approximately three weeks after EDF filed its brief on the merits, thus rendering the
case moot.135 EDF, however, requested attorneys' fees and expenses under the
Equal Access to Justice Act, which authorizes such awards to the prevailing
party in a suit brought by or against the United States unless the court finds,
among other facts, that the position of the government was "substantially
136
justified."
The EDF court had no difficulty finding that the suspensions constituted
rulemaking subject to public notice and comment, yet it did so by citing Gorsuch
for the proposition that "suspension or delayed implementation of a final regulation normally constitutes substantive rulemaking under APA § 553."137 The
court rejected the EPA's attempt to rely on the APA's "good cause" exception, 138 observing that prompt EPA action could have avoided the need for immediate suspensions. 139 The court noted that in January 1981 the EPA had
Register notice, it is highly unlikely that the EPA could have successfully argued a good cause
exception. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 261-90 and accompanying text.
129. 716 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), supersededby statute as stated in Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986); see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1985).
130. EDF, 716 F.2d at 917.
131. 46 Fed. Reg. 8395, 8395 (1981).
132. 47 Fed. Reg. 7841, 7841 (1982).
133. Id. at 7842.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67, 109-11.
135. EDF,716 F.2d at 917.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
137. EDF, 716 F.2d at 920 (emphasis added) (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch,
713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982).
139. EDF, 716 F.2d at 921.
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permanently suspended the annual report requirement for 1980 and had indicated its intent in July 1981 to suspend or eliminate the requirement. Yet the
agency waited until February 23, 1982, only one week before the due date of the
1981 annual report, to suspend the reporting requirements. 14 o This delay failed
to constitute the sort of emergency that satisfies the APA's good cause exception. 14 1 Moreover, the EPA's litigation tactics clearly displeased the court,
which chastised the agency for its "arbitrary" behavior in waiting until after
EDF filed its brief on the merits to render the case moot.142
The last of these later cases, NaturalResources Defense Council v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 143 (EPA) was decided in 1984. EPA involved a challenge to the EPA's revocation of its vessel emission requirements 44 under the
Clean Air Act. 145 The EPA requirements had directed that the emissions of air
pollutants from vessels coming to and from a marine terminal, and from ships at
dockside, were to be considered in regulating the construction and operation of
marine terminals. The revocation challenged in EPA was based primarily on the
EPA's reinterpretation of its statutory authority over vessel emissions and secondarily on the agency's view that the vessel emission requirements had been
promulgated in a procedurally defective manner. 14 6 The revocation was preceded by two EPA suspensions. The EPA first suspended, without notice and
comment, the vessel emission requirements for ninety days, pending reconsideration of those requirements. 147 Approximately two months after the temporary
suspension expired, the EPA again suspended the requirements, 148 this time
pending completion of a rulemaking on the agency's proposed revocation of the

requirements. 149
NRDC challenged both suspensions on procedural and substantive
grounds; 150 however, the failure to allege sufficient injury to establish an actual
controversy made it unnecessary for the court to address those aspects of the
case. 15 1 Nevertheless, the court's brief discussion of the suspensions raised some
interesting questions. The Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to "stay" the effectiveness of a rule for up to three months, pending EPA reconsideration of the
140.
141.
142.
143.
Circuit
144.
145.

Id. at 920-21.
Id. at 921.
Id.
725 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [abbreviated as EPA to distinguish it from the earlier Third
case involving the same parties, but a different statute].
45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,676 (1980).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).

146. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,554, 27,555 (1982). By the time of appeal the EPA apparently had deemphasized the procedural deficiency as a basis for the revocation. An intervenor, GATX Terminals
Corp., continued to press the procedural issue, however. EPA, 725 F.2d at 773.
147. 46 Fed. Reg. 36,695, 36,695 (1981). Industry petitions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and to the EPA itself prompted the reconsideration. Id. at 36,696.
Although the suspension did not provide for prior public comment, it did provide an opportunity to
submit comments in the 30 days after promulgation of the suspension on the question whether the
EPA should extend the suspension pending completion of the reconsideration process. Id. at 36,695.
148. 46 Fed. Reg. 61,612, 61,612 (1981).
149. Id. at 61,613.
150. EPA, 725 F.2d at 774.
151. Id.
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rule.' 5 2 The court noted the complexity of the questions raised by this section
regarding the EPA's authority to issue stays, the interplay of the section with
equitable
APA requirements, and "the extent to which agencies possess general 153
power to stay for extended periods validly promulgated regulations."
What is one to infer from the court's reference to "general equitable
power"? Perhaps the court was harkening back to the "equitable power" notion
of agency suspensions that inhered in Public Citizen.15 4 Perhaps certain "equitable power" cases constitute the exception to the "normal" case contemplated in
the EDFcourt's statement that "suspension or delayed implementation of a final
regulation normally constitutes substantive rulemaking under APA § 553."155
On the other hand, such speculation probably reads too much into the language chosen by the court in dismissing the challenges to the two EPA suspensions. The language more likely reflects the terminology the EPA used to
express its justification of the initial suspensions. In its Federal Register notice
of the suspension, the EPA characterized its action as "merely an administrative
order providing equitable relief for 90 days" 15 6 and not the "'promulgation or
revision of regulations' "157 within the meaning of section 307(d)(1) of the Clean
Air Act.15 8 It is unlikely that the court meant to reverse cavalierly the progress
made in resolving the procedural issues arising from agency suspensions.
At this time, the courts appear to have concluded that most, if not all, rule
suspensions should be characterized as rulemaking. They also appear to have
formulated a rationale for that conclusion and to have restricted the use of the
APA's good cause exception.
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDING SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES TO
AGENCY SUSPENSIONS

Substantive review of informal rulemaking under the APA is essentially
two-pronged. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the rule is
within the agency's statutory authority. 159 Second, the court must determine
152. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (1982). This section supersedes the procedural requirements of
the APA that would otherwise apply to certain rulemakings, including the category of regulations
involved in EPA. Id. § 7607(d)(1).
153. EPA, 725 F.2d at 774.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 11-23 (discussing Public Citizen).
155. EDF,716 F.2d at 920; see supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
156. 46 Fed. Reg. 36,695, 36,698 (1981) (emphasis added).
157. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982)). The EPA claimed that in any event it also had
"good cause" to omit prior notice and comment. Id.
158. Unlike the APA, which defines "rule making" as the "agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule," 5 U.S.C, § 551(5) (1982), the Clean Air Act applies its procedural
requirements to the "promulgation or revision" of regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1) (1982). The
extent to which the difference in terminology reflects a substantive difference is unclear.
159. The APA directs the reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is
"in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (1982). Courts vary in the degree to which they defer to the agency's own interpretation of
its statutory authority. The Supreme Court recently has stated that when congressional intent is
unclear, the reviewing court's duty is merely to determine whether the agency's interpretation is
"reasonable." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984). Yet the Court itself frequently has shown no deference to an apparently reasonable agency
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whether the rule is the product of rational decisionmaking. 160 This second determination commonly is referred to as the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of review, although sometimes the arbitrary and capricious standard is used to
refer to both determinations. 16 1 Although the applicable standard of review
generally is not disputed, the level of judicial scrutiny, or scope of review, applied under that standard may vary considerably. 1 62 Historically, courts have
upheld an agency's substantive judgments as long as those judgments were not
totally irrational. 163 Recently, however, some courts have applied the arbitrary
and capricious standard more rigorously. This heightened level of scrutiny gen164
erally is referred to as the "hard look" approach.
Although it is impossible to define hard look review precisely, a representative formulation would require the court to determine: First, whether the
agency adequately explained the facts and policies it relied on; second, whether
the administrative record provides reasonable support for those facts and policies; third, whether the agency adequately considered all relevant factors under
the statute and reasonably available alternatives to the agency's preferred course
of action; and fourth, whether the agency's ultimate conclusions are reasonably
related to the facts and policies relied upon. 165 Hard look review may mean that
the court is requiring the agency itself to take a hard look at the relevant factors,
that the court itself will take a hard look at the available evidence, or both. 166
interpretation in the face of unclear congressional intent. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Pertoleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Commentators have struggled to find a framework for
distinguishing between those instances in which a court should defer to an agency's statutory interpretation and those instances in which it should not defer, but instead should use its independent
judgment. See, eg., Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEo. L.J. 1
(1985); Note, A Frameworkfor JudicialReview of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation: Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469.
160. The reviewing court is to hold unlawful agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
161. Compare Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971) (including only the second determination under the arbitrary and capricious standard) with Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (including both determinations under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
162. The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction between the "standard of judicial review" and the "scope of review." See, eg., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43.
163. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 336 &
n.107, 337 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that only a "few" of the thousands of federal court decisions applying the arbitrary and capricious standard invalidate the agency action).
164. The hard look approach is attributed to Judge Leventhal. See Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971); Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmakingandtheRole of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509, 511 (1974).
165. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1413, 1424-26 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d
1011, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
166. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1413, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[W]e will look carefully at the Commission's
reasoning to ensure that all relevant factors and available alternatives were given adequate consideration .... "); National Lime Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (as more complete record accompanied rulemaking, hard look evolved from a description of the agency's responsibility to "connote the rigorous standard of judicial review"); Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507, 510-11 n.23, 525-26 (1985)
(referring to the scope of review which demands that the agency carefully consider relevant factors
as "quasi-procedural" review or "the agency's hard look," and referring to the scope of review under
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Proponents of more intrusive hard look review could find support for their position in the Supreme Court's assertion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe 167 that "inquiry into the facts" under the arbitrary and capricious standard "is to be searching and carefl,"168 whereas adherents of a more deferential
"ordinary look" or "soft glance" review could take comfort in Overton Park's
cautionary statement that, nevertheless, "the ultimate standard of review is a
169
narrow one."'
The reported decisions on agency suspensions generally devote far less attention to challenges to the substantive validity of the suspensions than they do
to procedural challenges.' 70 Of course, some cases were decided solely on procedural grounds,17 1 but even those deciding substantive challenges generally applied a deferential soft glance. Only as the courts developed some confidence in
characterizing agency suspensions as rulemakings subject to APA procedures
did they demonstrate a willingness to scrutinize substantive issues more closely
72
under the hard look approach.1
A.

The Early Cases: Taking a "Soft Glance"

The early cases deciding challenges to agency suspensions devoted scant
attention to issues surrounding the substantive validity of these suspensions.
Thus, in Public Citizen v. Department of Health and Human Services,173 Judge
Green disposed of the substantive challenge to the FDA's suspension of the patient package insert program even more summarily than she disposed of the
procedural challenge.174 Having determined that the suspension qualified as
"temporary," Judge Green concluded that the new FDA management "would
17 5
appear to be engaged in a reasonable examination of a controversial plan."'
Judge Green never discussed why the suspension was justified, apparently assuming that reexamination by a new administration always justified such action.
Nor did she discuss procedural alternatives that might have been available to the
76
agency.1
which the court carefully scrutinizes the relevant evidence and the agency's ultimate conclusions as
"substantive" review or "the court's hard look").
167. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
168. Id. at 416.
169. Id.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 173-76 (discussing Public Citizen); infra text accompanying notes 177-81 (discussing Southern Mountains); infra text accompanying notes 182-85 (discussing

Devine).
171. See supra notes 56-81 and accompanying text (discussing NRDC); supra notes 88-106 and
accompanying text (discussing Gorsuch); supra text accompanying notes 129-42 (discussing EDF).
172. See infra notes 221-60 and accompanying text (discussing Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d

93 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

173. No. 81-0820 (D.D.C. July 31, 1981) (mem.), aff'd, 671 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per

curiam).
174. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
175. Public Citizen, No. 81-0820, slip op. at 2.
176. Id. at 23. The court of appeals summarily affirmed Judge Green's dismissal of the substantive challenge to the suspension. Public Citizen, 671 F.2d at 519.
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The court in Council of the Southern Mountains v. Donovan 177 engaged in
somewhat more careful consideration before holding that the Mine Safety and
Health Administration's six-month suspension of its regulations requiring that
underground coal miners be provided with self-rescue safety devices was not
arbitrary and capricious. 178 In light of genuine questions about the safety and
availability of these devices, the court had no difficulty in upholding the agency's
179
decision to defer implementation until the questions could be answered.
Given the apparent genuineness of these safety concerns, the court probably
would have upheld the suspension even under a more rigorous review standard.
The court did consider an alternative, proposed by the petitioners, by which the
Secretary of Labor could allow the regulations to take effect, but then exercise
his discretion to assess only token fines against coal operators who, although in
violation of the regulations, could show that they had ordered the devices. 180
The court, however, did not require that the agency consider this alternative and
present its own reasons for rejecting it. Rather, the court itself suggested that
the Secretary of Labor "could reasonably conclude that his energies were better
devoted to completion of field testing." 181 Thus, the level of review fell short of
a hard look.
The court in National Federation of FederalEmployees v. Devine18 2 similarly applied a "limited" scope of review in upholding the Office of Personnel
Management's suspension of the 1981 open season for federal employee health
plans. 1 83 The court found the indefinite suspension reasonable in light of the
uncertainties the agency faced over litigation regarding benefit reductions and
the actuarial problems raised by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. 184 Nor did the court
require the agency to consider alternative regulatory solutions expressly. Instead, the court itself addressed the alternative of a shorter, fixed-term suspension, concluding that "[i]n these .circumstances, OPM was not required on
November 6 to set a definite future date for holding open season." 185
Thus, the courts in these first three suspension cases applied a deferential
level of judicial review traditionally associated with the arbitrary and capricious
test without considering whether the nature of the regulatory action warranted
more rigorous scrutiny. The courts failed to discuss the agencies' supporting
documentation for their actions with any degree of particularity, and they did
not require the agencies to consider alternative regulatory actions. The scope of
review applied to an agency suspension intensified considerably, however, in the
one case that was decided after the Supreme Court's decision in Motor Vehicle
177. 653 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
178. Id. at 583.
179. Id. at 577, 583.
180. Id. at 583 n.43.
181. Id.
182. 671 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
183. Id. at 612.
184. Id. OPM's notice of suspension did not discuss any alternatives. 46 Fed. Reg. 55,679,
55,679 (1981).
185. Devine, 671 F.2d at 612.
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ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 186

B. The Implications of State Farm for Agency Suspensions
The Supreme Court's decision in the State Farm "passive restraint" case

seems destined to become a classic administrative law case, much discussed by
legal scholars. 187 This section will briefly summarize the case and focus on its
implications for judicial review of agency suspensions.
In State Farm the Supreme Court held that the decision by the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to rescind a regulation requiring that new motor vehicles be equipped with passive safety restraints was arbitrary and capricious.18 8 The rescinded regulation had a "complex and
convoluted history" involving a series of regulatory amendments, extensions,

and suspensions. 189 The final version of the regulation, known as "Modified
Standard 208," was issued during the Carter Administration in 1977.190 This
standard required that new cars be equipped with passive restraints beginning
with large cars in the 1982 model year and extending to all cars by the 1984

model year.191 Automobile manufacturers could choose to meet the standard by
installing either airbags or automatic seatbelts.192

Only one month after taking office under the new Reagan Administration,
Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis reopened the rulemaking and, after
public notice and comment, NHTSA rescinded Modified Standard 208.193
186. 463 U.S. 29 (1983); see infra notes 221-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
sole post-State Farm case, Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
187. See, e.g., Dunn, Administrative Law-A Look at Judicial Review of the Department of
Transportation'sRescission of the Passive Restraint Standard, I1 N. Ky. L. REV. 455 (1984); Edwards, JudicialReview of Deregulation, 11 N. Ky. L. Rv. 229, 241-55 (1984); Garland, supra note
166, at 542-49; Smythe, JudicialReview of Rule Rescissions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1928, 1931-35
(1984); Sunstein, Deregulationand the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177, 189-213; Note,
JudicialReview of Rescissions of Rules: A "Passive Restraint" on Deregulation, 53 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 252, 270-280 (1985); Note, Administrative Law-JudicialReview of Agency Action: Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 32 U. KAN. L.
REV. 884 (1984); Note, Automatic Occupant Restraints andJudicialReview: How a FederalAgency
Can Violate Congressional Will and Get Away With It, 19 VAL. U.L. REV. 693 (1985).
188. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46.
189. Id. at 34. Justice White's opinion provides a concise summary of this regulatory history.
Id. at 34-38.
190. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1977). For background on the regulation, see 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289
(1977).
191. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2 to S4.1.3 (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upheld the standard. Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d
1338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).
192. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2 to S4.1.3 (1977). Automatic seatbelts, unlike manual belts, require no action by the automobile occupant, but instead automatically envelop the occupant when he
or she enters the vehicle and closes the door. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,419 (1981).
193. Secretary of Transportation Lewis proposed a one-year delay in the passive restraint requirement for large cars, citing the substantial decrease in the production of large cars and the
economic difficulties of the automobile industry. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,033, 12,033-34 (1981). After completion of the public comment period, Secretary Lewis issued a final rule delaying the effective date
for large cars by one year-from September 1, 1981, to September 1, 1982. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208
S4.1.2. For background of this regulation, see 46 Fed. Reg. 21,172 (1981). On the same day Secretary Lewis proposed to amend Modified Standard 208 in one of three ways: By requiring small car
compliance first (by September 1, 1982, followed with compliance by midsize cars one year later, and
compliance by large cars two years later); by requiring simultaneous compliance by all size cars on
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NHTSA's rationale for its rescission was that the agency no longer could find, as

it had in 1977, that the considerable costs of installing passive restraints would

be justified by substantial safety benefits.1 94 The agency found that, contrary to

its earlier assumptions, manufacturers overwhelmingly would choose automatic
seatbelts and not airbags as the predominant means of compliance with the standard. Furthermore, most of these automatic belts would be of a type that could
be easily and permanently detached. 195 After concluding that the detached belt
would be functionally equivalent to a manual seatbelt, the agency no longer had
any basis for predicting an increase in the use of seatbelts sufficient to produce
the desired safety benefits. In view of this conclusion, NHTSA determined that
the standard was no longer "reasonable" and "practicable," as required by the
agency's statute. 196
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed petitions for review of the agency's rescission in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The
court of appeals found that NHTSA's rescission was arbitrary and capricious, a
finding the Supreme Court affrmed. 197 The Court unanimously found that the
agency had acted arbitrarily in rescinding the standard without considering the
alternatives of amending the standard to require either airbags or nondetachable
automatic seatbelts.1 9 8 By a five to four vote, the Court also found that the
agency had insufficiently explained its conclusion that detachable automatic
seatbelts would not produce substantial safety benefits.199
The State Farm decision indicates the proper response to some of the issues
raised by the suspension cases. First, the Court held that the same arbitrary and

capricious test that applied to the rescission or modification of a safety standard
applied to its promulgation. 200 One basis for this holding was the language of
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act itself, which subjects to the requirements of the
March 1, 1983; or by rescinding the standard. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,205, 21,205 (1981). At the close of
the public comment period, the Administrator of NHTSA issued the final rule that rescinded the
standard. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2 (1982). For the background of the rule, see 46 Fed. Reg.
53,419 (1981). The Secretary's general authority to promulgate safety standards under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982), has been delegated to
the Administrator of NHTSA. 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (1986).
194. The agency estimated that the standard would increase car prices approximately $1 billion
a year. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,419-26 (1981).
195. Id. at 53,421.
196. Id. at 53,420.
197. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 208 (D.C. Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
198. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46, 55-56.
199. Id. at 52. The majority held that NHTSA had failed to consider that the factor of inertia,
which by the agency's own studies accounted for most of the nonuse of manual seatbelts, might well
prevent many people from taking affirmative acts to detach an automatic seatbelt. Thus, the inertia
factor, which worked against the use of manual belts, might work in favor of the use of automatic
belts. Id. at 54 & n.18. The four dissenters, who would have imposed a significantly lighter burden
on the agency to explain its rescission, found NHTSA's prediction that the increase in belt usage
would be small to be a rational one. Id. at 57-59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
200. Id. at 41.
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APA "all orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard" 20 1 without differentiating between the standard of judicial review applicable to promulgations and revocations. Although some statutes contain comparable provisions addressing the applicability of the APA,20 2 many do
not.20 3 Nevertheless, the lower court decisions subsequent to State Farm automatically applied the arbitrary and capricious standard without addressing the
absence of comparable provisions from the applicable enabling statutes. 2° 4 This
omission is justified by the other bases for the holding in State Farm. Rejecting
the argument of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association that the courts
should judge the rescission or revocation of a rule by the extremely deferential
standard applied to an agency's refusal to promulgate a rule in the first place, the
Court noted that neither the Motor Vehicle Safety Act nor the APA indicated
20 5
that rescissions should be treated as refusals to promulgate rules.
The Court did not elaborate on its view of the APA. The APA suggests no
distinction for purposes of judicial review between rescissions and other
rulemaking actions, but the APA also suggests no distinction for purposes of
judicial review between refusals to promulgate rules and affirmative rulemakings. 20 6 Yet the Supreme Court implicitly accepted the view that agency refusals to promulgate rules are subject either to a particularly deferential application
of the arbitrary and capricious standard or to a different and more deferential
standard altogether.
More importantly, the Court distinguished a revocation from a refusal to
promulgate a rule because, unlike a refusal to promulgate a rule, a "[r]evocation
'20 7
constitutes a reversal of the agency's former views as to the proper course.
The Court established a presumption in favor of the "settled course of behavior"
embodied in the prior rule that the agency could overcome only by supplying "a
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance. ' 20 8 The Court indicated that a primary
concern in viewing the agency's reversal of the status quo reflected in its prior
rule is that the reversal may signal the agency's departure from the congres201. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1982).
202. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a) (1982) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
203. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1982) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1982)
(Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
204. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1985); International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
205. State Farm, 463 US. at 41.
206. The APA directs the reviewing court, inter alia, to hold unlawful "agency action, findings,
and conclusions" found to be arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). "Agency action" includes "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof or failure to act." Id. § 551(13). The APA defines "rule making" as the
"agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." Id. § 551(5). This definition excludes agency inaction, whereas "repealing" a rule encompasses agency rescissions. A conclusion
that the failure to promulgate a rule is not a rulemaking action but is adjudicatory in nature (the
APA defines "adjudication" as a final agency disposition in all matters other than a rulemaking, id.
§ 551(6)-(7)) still does not provide a textual basis under the APA for applying a different standard of
review to agency inaction.
207. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42.
208. Id.
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20 9
sional policies embodied in the agency's enabling statute.

Furthermore, not only might the reviewing court need to scrutinize more
carefully the agency's consistency with its statutory mandate when the agency

reverses a prior rulemaking, but the court's ability to do so in this situation is
immeasurably greater. When the agency revokes a prior rule, the administrative

record aids the review process tremendously: it includes not only the record
that the agency has established to support the revocation, but also the record
established to support the initial promulgation of the rule. 2 10 This earlier record
is likely to contain much of the evidence now presented by opponents of the
revocation and formerly accepted by the agency.
Not only did the State Farm Court reject the petitioner's argument that
revocations should be reviewed like refusals to act, but it rejected the notion that
the arbitrary and capricious standard requires only the minimum rationality
2 11
The
that a statute must bear to be valid under the due process clause.
Supreme Court also held that the court of appeals "erred in intensifying the
scope of its review based upon its reading of [postenactment] legislative events"
involving Congress' reaction to Modified Standard 208.212 However, although
the Supreme Court's review was not as probing as that conducted by the court of
209. Id. The court of appeals' decision stated this concern explicitly. Judge Mikva noted that
the concern for consistency in agency adjudications is based on the reliance problems created by
agency departures from precedent, a much lesser concern when agency changes from prior rulemakings are involved. Instead, Judge Mikva stated that the concern over agency reversals in the course
of rulemaking is based on the fear that "sudden and profound alterations in an agency's policy
constitute 'danger signals' that the will of Congress is being ignored." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
210. The Supreme Court has recognized this relationship between the extent of the administrative record and the ability of the courts to perform their review function. See, eg., Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417-20 (1971). Courts presented with challenges to
agency inaction have expressed similar concerns. See, eg., National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
211. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9.
212. Id. at 44. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court's statement indicated its disagreement
merely with the basis for the court of appeals' heightened scope of review or more broadly with the
very concept of an intensified scope of review. Moreover, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court
itself applied a heightened scope of review to NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement. The Court's statement that "the direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter
the standard of judicial review," id. at 42, may indicate the Court's rejection of the concept of
intensified scrutiny of rule revocations. Because the statement was made to reject the argument that
rule revocations should be subject to more lenient judicial scrutiny than rule promulgations, however, the Court may not have been addressing the contrary argument that revocations should be
subject to even more rigorous scrutiny.
The Court did accept NHTSA's view that the empirical evidence of substantially increased
usage rates with detachable automatic seatbelts, drawn from studies of their use in certain models of
Volkswagen and Chevrolet compact automobiles, could not be extrapolated to automobile occupants
generally. Id. at 52-53. The Supreme Court's stated deference to the agency on this point stands in
stark contrast to the court of appeals' detailed dissection of the agency's reasoning. State Farm, 680
F.2d at 231 n.30. The Court noted that this extrapolation was "precisely the type of issue which
rests within the expertise of NHTSA, and upon which a reviewing court must be most hesitant to
intrude." State Farm, 463 U.S. at 53. More significantly, however, the Court examined the record
in some detail and presented its own view, based on several public attitude surveys, that the same
inertia factor that worked against the use of manual seatbelts would work in favor of the use of
automatic seatbelts. Id. at 53-54. The surveys showed that although 20 to 40% of the public opposed wearing manual seatbelts, a greater percentage merely forgot to use belts or found them inconvenient. Id. at 54 n.18.
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213
appeals, it too represented a version of hard look review.

Finally, State Farm clearly endorsed the view that an agency decision made
without considering reasonable policy alternatives is arbitrary and capricious.
The scope of the requirement to consider alternatives, however, remains unclear.
State Farm was an extreme case in which the alternatives the agency had failed
to consider-narrowing the standard to require airbags or nondetachable automatic belts-were technological options already within the scope of Modified
Standard 208.214 The Court rejected the opposite extreme of requiring an
agency to consider "every alternative device and thought conceivable by the
mind of man."' 215 The Court did not indicate at what point between these two
extremes the duty to consider alternatives ended.
State Farm suggests several lessons about agency suspensions. An agency's
decision to suspend a promulgated rule, like a decision to revoke a rule, signifies
a change from the agency's former view that the rule represented an appropriate
means by which to implement its statutory mandate. If the decision to suspend
does not necessarily represent a complete reversal of the agency's earlier views, it
at least represents a withdrawal of agency support sufficient to stop the rule dead
in its tracks. Suspensions, like revocations, not only represent a change from the
status quo, but also present the reviewing court with a substantial administrative
record for its scrutiny. Thus, the reviewing court should start from the proposition that the agency is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis to justify its decision to change course by suspending the regulation. The court should also
scrutinize the agency's analysis to ensure that the agency considered reasonable
policy alternatives to the suspension, possibly including procedural as well as
substantive alternatives. Finally, the court may be justified in applying heightened scrutiny to the agency's action to ensure that the action conforms to the
congressional policies embodied in the agency's enabling statute.
What most concerned the State Farm Court, and what best explains its
willingness to scrutinize the agency's action so carefully, was the Court's welljustified suspicion that solicitude for the economic woes of the automobile industry, rather than legitimate doubts about the public benefits of passive restraints,
motivated the revocation of Modified Standard 208. The Court pointedly remarked that Secretary Lewis had reopened the rulemaking due to the economic
difficulties of the automobile industry, 2 16 which for a decade had waged "the
213. Compare Garland, supra note 166, at 542-53 (arguing that the Court required both that the
agency supply a reasoned analysis of the data and that the Court itself take a hard look at the
reasonableness of the agency's policy choice) with R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW AND PROcEss 394-400 (1985) [hereinafter PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL] (arguing
that the Court showed substantial deference to the agency's policy decisions).
214. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50-51.

215. Id. at 51 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978)).

216. Id. at 38. NHTSA continued to cite the economic circumstances of the industry in its
rulemaking to delay by one year the effective date of the passive restraint requirement. 46 Fed. Reg.
12,033, 12,033-34 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 21,172, 21,175 (1981). Although the notice announcing the

rescission of Modified Standard 208 omitted any direct reference to the economic woes of the industry, it did discuss the cost of passive restraints. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,423-24 (1981).
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regulatory equivalent of war against the airbag."' 217 The Court chastised the
agency for deferring to industry's choice of detachable seatbelts over airbags or
nondetachable automatic belts. 2 18 In effect, the agency improperly had delegated a portion of its authority under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act to the very
industry whose indifference to safety concerns had prompted Congress to pass
the Act. 2 19 Recognizing that cost was a legitimate factor under the statute, the
Court nevertheless stressed that "Congress intended safety to be the pre-eminent
factor under the [Motor Vehicle Safety] Act . . 2220 Thus, the State Farm
Court's scope of review inevitably was influenced by its perception that the
agency had strayed from the path marked by Congress.
C. After State Farm Taking a "HardLook"
In Public Citizen v. Steed 221 the court in an opinion by Judge Mikva again
took a probing, skeptical look at another NHTSA decision, in this case the indefinite suspension of NHTSA's tire treadwear grading regulations. The court
did not approve of what it saw, and it reversed the agency's suspension as arbitrary and capricious. 222 The court based its decision on the failure of the administrative record to justify the suspension and the failure of the agency to consider
223
adequately alternative courses of action.
Although the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act required the
promulgation of uniform tire grading standards by 1968,224 NHTSA and its
predecessor agencies took until 1974 to comply with that requirement. 225 Moreover, this action was taken only in settlement of a lawsuit filed against the
agency by a consumer group. 226 Several tire manufacturers then filed suit challenging the standards, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the regulations in most respects in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department
of Transportation227 (Goodrich I). The Goodrich I court rejected industry
claims that the information provided to consumers would be misleading, and
concluded that the statute required "reasonably fair and reasonably reliable pro217. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 49.
218. Id.
219. It was in part a similar concern over the delegation of authority to self-interested industry
groups that led to the famous decision invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act. See
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
220. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 55. Justice Rehnquist's dissent recognized that a new administration may reappraise the costs and benefits of its regulations in light of its own policy preferences as
long as it does not ignore statutory standards. Justice Rehnquist was satisfied, however, that
NHTSA's reappraisal was statutorily authorized merely because Congress had not directed the
agency to require passive restraints. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Rehnquist's position, however, ignored the preeminence of safety as a factor in agency
standard setting under the statute.
221. 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
222. Id. at 94.
223. Id. at 99-100.
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982).
225. See 40 Fed. Reg. 23,073, 23,073 (1975).
226. Steed, 733 F.2d at 94 (citing Nash v. Brinegar, No. 177-73 (D.D.C. May 2, 1974)).
227. 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977) (Goodrich I).
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cedures, not theoretical perfection. ' 228 Pursuant to the court's remand on several minor issues, 229 NHTSA amended and reissued the regulations in 1978.230
The reissued regulations survived another court challenge by the tire
23 1
industry.
In 1983, following a public comment period, NHTSA indefinitely suspended the treadwear grading requirements. 2 32 The agency stated that information and comments provided by the industry prompted it to review the
requirements for possible revision. 233 On review, NHTSA concluded that the
treadwear grading system was too unreliable to justify its continuance and, in
fact, provided misleading information to consumers.2 34 NHTSA attributed the
cause of unreliability primarily to variability in the treadwear test results and
secondarily to variations in the manner in which tire manufacturers translated
the test results into an assigned treadwear grade.2 35 The agency considered and
rejected two alternatives to suspending the treadwear grading requirement.
First, it rejected rescinding the program because of the "substantial possibility"
that further research could eventually lead to revisions that would reduce test
variability to acceptable levels. Second, it rejected continuing the treadwear
grading system while conducting further research because it viewed the
treadwear grading system as so unreliable as to be "affirmatively misleading" to
2 36
consumers.
The court of appeals in Steed repudiated NHTSA's argument that, because
the challenged action was a temporary suspension rather than a rescission, the
court should be less rigorous than the Supreme Court in State Farm in applying
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 237 Not only did the Steed court doubt
that the suspension would be short, but more important it recognized that
whether the suspension was temporary or permanent, the reasoning that
prompted the suspension represented a complete reversal of the agency's prior
position. 238 Thus, the court required that the agency justify its new position and
its rejection of "reasonably obvious" alternative courses of action. 239
The Steed court scrutinized the administrative record in a fairly detailed
228. Id. at 1189.
229. The remand required NHTSA to consider adding information on tire labels and dealer
information sheets to point out limitations inherent in the assigned grades and the tire tests, and to
complete testing of its radial course monitoring tire-used as a control standard for radial test

tires-to ensure its accuracy. Id. at 1185, 1189.
230. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,542 (1978) (codified as amended at 49 C.F.R. § 575.104 (1986)).
231. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transp., 592 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1979) (Goodrich
II).
232. 48 Fed. Reg. 5690, 5690 (1983).
233. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,084, 30,085 (1982) (notice of proposed suspension). NHTSA had earlier
published a notice of its intent to evaluate and revise the tire grading system, as well as several other
NHTSA regulations. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,203 (1981); see infra note 247 and accompanying text.
234. 48 Fed. Reg. 5690, 5692 (1983).

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 5692.
Id. at 5697.
Steed, 733 F.2d at 98.
Id.
Id. at 99 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n,

606 F.2d 1031, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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and highly skeptical manner. It found that NHTSA had identified several
sources of variability in test results, but viewed the variability data now relied on
by NHTSA as essentially similar to industry data that NHTSA had previously
rejected-a rejection upheld in the Goodrich litigation. 24° Moreover, the agency
failed to identify adequately the extent of the variability. 24 1 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the evidence regarding variability of test results did not
242
justify the agency's change in position.
The agency identified the use of different grading practices by tire manufacturers as a secondary cause of misleading treadwear information. 243 The court,
however, found these industry practices not inconsistent with the original purpose of the grading program, which was to establish for consumers a minimum
level of treadwear performance. 244 Although tire manufacturers faced with
comparable test data assigned different grades to their tires, the fact most of the
grade discrepancies involved differing degrees of undergrading meant that consumers could rely on tire grades to guarantee minimum treadwear performance. 245 Although the agency argued that this undergrading reduced
consumers' ability to compare the relative treadwear performance of different
tires, the Steed court held that NHTSA could not suspend the grading program
solely because it failed to serve this new purpose of facilitating consumer comparisons. Only a showing that the original purpose was either unreasonable or
not being served by the grading program would warrant total elimination of any
treadwear program. 246 Moreover, NHTSA itself indicated that grading procedures could be standardized and test variability minimized.2 47 Accordingly, the
court found the agency's decision to suspend the treadwear standards-rather
than to retain the standards while seeking ways to minimize variability in test
24 8
results and grade assignments-to be arbitrary and capricious.
The Steed decision is supportable, but much of the court's opinion presents
the issue in terms of the agency's unreasonable view of the evidence, when the
real issue was the agency's violation of its statutory mandate. Arguably, the
240. Id. at 102. NHTSA also developed data of its own, but the court characterized that data as
"thin." Id.
241. Id. at 101.

242. Id.
243. 48 Fed. Reg. 5690, 5692 (1983). The Steed court, however, characterized the agency's
statement of basis and purpose that accompanied the suspension as focused primarily on data relating to treadwear grading practices. Steed, 733 F.2d at 101.
244. Steed, 733 F.2d at 101.
245. Id. (citing NHTSA's Final Regulatory Evaluation).
246. Id. at 102.
247. NHTSA had earlier proposed a standardized grading procedure. 46 Fed. Reg. 10,429,
10,429 (1981). In response to public comments pointing out various deficiences in the proposal,
NHTSA apparently had drafted a revised procedure; however, without adequate explanation,
NHTSA left the uniform grade proposal dormant and instead chose to suspend the treadwear program. Steed, 733 F.2d at 104-05.
NHTSA also conceded that the three primary sources of variability it was able to quantify were
readily correctable, id. at 104-05, yet failed to continue the treadwear grading program while working to minimize the variability problems. NHTSA made this concession in responding to a Uniroyal
petition for reconsideration of the suspension. 48 Fed. Reg. 32,588, 32,591 (1983). Uniroyal tires
apparently received high scores on the treadwear tests.
248. Steed, 733 F.2d at 105.
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court can be criticized for locking the agency into its earlier views of the variability data and the purpose of treadwear grading. Ten years earlier the agency

had concluded that the evidence of variability in test results was insufficient to
judge the treadwear grading program misleading to consumers, and the Good-

rich I court found that agency conclusion to be reasonable. For that same
agency, again presented with similar evidence of variability, to conclude that the
grading program was so flawed as to be misleading to consumers is not necessarily unreasonable.

249

In addition, experience with the program may have led the agency to conclude that the real benefit of treadwear grading to consumers was to facilitate

comparison shopping rather than to guarantee a minimum level of treadwear
performance. Thus, the cautious undergrading necessary to guarantee perform-

ance at or above a specified minimum level conflicted with the accurate grading
necessary to provide comparative information.2 50 Viewed in this light, the court
in Steed seems to have improperly substituted its policy views for those of the
agency. Certainly, the court's highly critical tone in Steed seems to reflect its
own view that providing consumers with imperfect treadwear information was
25 1
preferable to providing no treadwear information at all.
The real issue in Steed, however, was whether Congress indicated its policy
regarding the proper balance between the agency's desire to develop more accurate information and to avoid imposing unnecessary costs on industry, on the

one hand, and the need to provide consumers with treadwear information, on
the other. Although the court's discussion was couched in terms of the reasona-

bleness of the agency's justification for the suspension, it more properly should
have discussed whether this new policy view was authorized by the agency's
25 2

enabling statute.
NHTSA undoubtedly was correct in concluding that "Congress did not
have any specific types of information requirements in mind for the tire quality
249. The Steed decision is criticized on this basis in PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note
213, at 368. If the evidence of variability problems remained essentially unchanged, then what
clearly did change was the agency's view of the significance of these problems. NHTSA might reasonably have explained that it no longer believed that the substantial costs of the treadwear grading
program, costs ultimately paid by consumers, were justified by the benefits of the existing program.
NHTSA estimated the costs of treadwear testing at $10 million annually and expressly referred to
that cost as a factor supporting its proposed suspension. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,084, 30,088 (1982). The
proposed suspension itself was a product of a review of existing regulations NHTSA performed to
determine whether modifications might be appropriate to reduce unnecessary or excessive regulatory
burdens on industry. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,203, 21,203-04 (1981). Both the tire grading standards and
the passive restraint standard that was the subject of the State Farm case were among the regulations
identified as those that the agency intended to modify. Id. at 21,204.
The agency's new view might have been that the continued imposition of these costs could be
justified only by more reliable assurances of test validity, assurances that it was unlikely to have
without substantial research into test improvements. "The agency concludes that the government
has a superior duty not to participate in such an effort [to disseminate misinformation] to the probable detriment of consumers, who have every reason to ... assume that such participation implies
and connotes, a higher level certainty that [sic] the agency can now find in this well-intentioned
effort." 48 Fed. Reg. 5690, 5698 (1983).
250. See 46 Fed. Reg. 10,429 (1981).
251. See, e.g., PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 213, at 368.
252. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
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grading system."' 253 It is clear, however, that Congress directed the agency to
assist consumers by promulgating a tire grading system 25 4 and that treadwear

appeared to be the characteristic "most meaningful" to consumers. 255 The
existence of the statutory directive suggests that Congress' chosen policy was to

elevate the need for consumer information above concern over imposing regulatory costs on the tire industry. 256 Moreover, the fact the statute required that
standards be promulgated within two years indicates that Congress did not intend the agency to eliminate every source of variability in test results before
issuing grading standards. 2 57 Thus, the statute might properly be read to erect a

presumption in favor of regulation-a presumption that the agency could not
overcome by emphasizing the costs of complying with the standard 25 8 or by
imposing on the test procedures an evidentiary standard more appropriate to a
trial-type adjudication than to informal rulemaking. 25 9 Although the Steed
court failed to present the issue clearly as one of statutory authority, its decision
ultimately seems to rest on its belief that NHTSA's suspension amounted to a

"complete flouting" of the statutory scheme. 260
IV. A

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF AGENCY SUSPENSIONS

As the prior discussion illustrates, agency suspensions have raised issues
regarding the characterization of suspensions as rulemakings subject to APA
procedural requirements, the application of the APA's "good cause" exception
to suspensions conducted without prior public notice and opportunity to comment, and the proper scope of substantive judicial review. This section of the
Article proposes that agency suspensions always be characterized as rulemakings subject to APA procedural requirements, thus exempting suspensions from
prior notice and comment only in those narrow circumstances that satisfy the
253. 48 Fed. Reg. 32,588, 32,592 (1983).
254. 15 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982).
255. Steed, 733 F.2d at 96 (quoting an NHTSA fact sheet accompanying its notice of intent to
amend the tire grading standards).
256. This is not to imply that the costs of regulation are an impermissible factor under the
statute, but simply that consumers' need for tire information is to be given paramount importance.
Cf. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 412-13 (noting that the very existence of statutes requiring the Secretary of Transportation to avoid providing funds for the construction of highways through public
parks indicates that park preservation was a factor paramount to considerations of cost and community disruption).
257. Cf. Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340, 341 (D.D.C. 1981) (statutory directive to issue
regulations within 18 months indicated Congress' intent that the agency not wait to resolve all conceivable problems, but rather that it issue reasonable regulations and later consider revision when
appropriate).
258. The court clearly suspected that the agency's true motivation was to relieve the tire manufacturers of the costs of complying with the treadwear grading standard. See, eg., Steed, 733 F.2d at
100 (noting the agency's concern over the "substantial burden," estimated at $10 million annually,
on the tire industry). In fact, this $10 million figure was less than the $17 million the industry
predicted it would cost annually to label tires-a cost the Goodrich I court found to be well within
the costs contemplated by Congress when it passed the statute. Goodrich I, 541 F.2d at 1185.
259. See Muris, Rules Without Reason-The Case ofthe FTC, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at
20, 25-26 (presenting a Federal Trade Commission official's argument that a more rigorous evidentiary burden should be imposed by the agency on its own rulemaking proceedings).
260. Steed, 733 F.2d at 105.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

good cause exception. It further proposes that the scope of judicial review be
heightened when circumstances suggest that the agency may be acting contrary
to its statutory authority.
A. ProceduralReview
1. Characterizing Suspensions as Rulemaking
Several approaches may be used to identify those actions that should properly be classified as rulemakings. No matter which approach is used, however,
the inescapable conclusion is that an agency's action to suspend a promulgated
rule itself constitutes rulemaking. Moreover, the fact a suspension may be "temporary" or "short-term" should not alter its classification as rulemaking.
One first might attempt to determine whether a suspension constitutes
rulemaking by resorting to the APA's definitions of "rule" and "rule making."
A "rule" is "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy." 26 1 "Rule making" is the "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule."'2 62 Certainly these definitions are sufficiently broad to encompass suspensions, 263 which typically are statements of general applicability
and future effect that "amend" a previously promulgated rule.
An agency suspension, at least for a time, operates to change the law that
otherwise would apply to the regulated public. The legislative history of the
APA emphasizes that a rule prescribes conduct for the future, as distinguished
from an adjudicatory order, which pronounces past or existing rights or liabilities. 264 The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
adds that rulemaking is essentially legislative in nature because it is concerned
primarily with policy considerations rather than with the evaluation of a respondent's conduct.2 65 Suspensions certainly prescribe or, by relieving a regulatory
restriction, authorize conduct for the future and do so in large measure based on
policy considerations.
Related to this definitional approach is the formalistic view expressed by
the court in NRDC2 66 that, because no rule could have future effect without an
effective date, the effective date is an integral part of the rule. Thus, the indefinite suspension of that effective date constitutes rulemaking, as would outright
261. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982).
262. Id. § 551(5).
263. In fact, the APA definition of rulemaking is sufficiently broad that, taken to extremes, it
could include most of what might otherwise be called adjudication, which the APA defines as the

residuum of those agency actions that do not constitute rulemaking. Id. § 551(6)-(7).
264. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 197, 254 (1946) [hereinafter S. Doc. No. 248],
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONG., 1944-46,
197, 254 (1946).

265. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 13-14 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].

266. 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 56-87 for discussion of
NRDC.
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revocation of the rule.2 67 To allow an indefinite suspension or a series of shortterm suspensions to escape notice and comment would authorize an agency to
implement a de facto repeal of its regulation without the public participation
required for formal repeal.
Defining a suspension as an act of rulemaking rather than an act of adjudication, however, fails to address the question whether it is the kind of rulemaking that requires an opportunity for public comment. Determining whether the
APA's procedural requirements of notice and comment apply to an agency's
action in suspending a rule is more illuminating than merely attempting to attach the proper label to that action.
Public participation in rulemaking serves two important functions. The
first function is to provide the agency with information and ideas relevant to the
rulemaking. 268 This information may include factual data peculiarly available
to those who will be affected by the rule, as well as policy considerations and
political arguments. Providing the agency with relevant information contributes
to sound decisionmaking. The second function is to aid members of the affected
public by affording them an opportunity to present their views to the agency and
thus protect their own interests. 269 Providing affected persons an opportunity to
participate in decisions that may have significant consequences for them is basic
to our society's concept of fundamental fairness. In addition, it helps legitimize
decisionmaking by a nonelected federal agency. Moreover, given the agency's
flexibility to alter its substantive views before final promulgation of a rule and
the considerable judicial deference given to those substantive views once embodthe only real opportunity
ied in a final rule, participation in rulemaking may be
270
decision.
agency's
the
affect
to
parties
for interested
A functional approach to APA procedural requirements argues strongly for
their application to agency suspensions. The approach is drawn from the judicial tests commonly used to distinguish agency policy statements which are exempt from notice-and-comment requirements, 27 1 from substantive rules which,
absent "good cause," are not exempt from these requirements. The first test
asks whether the agency pronouncement has "palpable effects" or a "substantial
impact" on the regulated public. The second test asks whether the agency pronouncement requires that the agency apply it without discretion in future decisionmaking. 272 The palpable effects test thus focuses on the need of affected
267. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. The court's language suggests that it thought the
classification of temporary suspensions as rules presented a potentially different question.
268. See Jordan, The Administrative ProcedureAct's "Good Cause" Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L.
REV. 113, 116-17 (1984); Note, A FunctionalApproach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the
AdministrativeProcedureAct to Agency Statements ofPolicy, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 430, 439-40 (1976).
269. See Jordan, supra note 268, at 116-17; Note, supra note 268, at 439-40.
270. Agency attorneys and private practitioners before those agencies recognize the fundamental
importance of full and effective participation in agency rulemaking. See generally DeLong, How to
Convince an Agency, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 27 (discussing general canons of advocating
regulatory policies); Eckert, RepresentingPrivate Clients in EPA Rule Making, 1 NAT. REsOURCEs
& ENV'T 27 (Winter 1985) (discussing a set of precepts to be used when representing clients before
the EPA).
271. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982).
272. See Note, An Analysis of the GeneralStatement of Policy Exception to Notice and Comment
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parties to protect their interests through participation in agency decision making. The "binding norm" test focuses on the agency's need to obtain relevant
information from the public before making policy decisions.2 73

As the court in NRDC recognized, suspension of a promulgated rule does
have palpable effects on both the regulated industry and the public in general. 274

Clearly it was important that both industry and the public be afforded the opportunity to influence the EPA's decision to postpone the industry's obligation

to comply with pollution control standards. The decision to suspend the pretreatment rule also satisfied the binding norm test by eliminating the agency's
discretion to impose and enforce the pretreatment requirements during the suspension period. That decision normally should be preceded by the agency's so-

licitation of relevant information from the public. The value of providing the
agency with a broader base of information was, in fact, clearly demonstrated by
the EPA's agreement with public comments submitted in a subsequent rulemak-

ing which indicated that portions of the suspended regulations were beneficial to
275
the operation of the pretreatment program.

Not only are the twin purposes of public participation in rulemaking furthered by providing an opportunity for notice and comment prior to an agency

suspension, but the countervailing considerations that lead to the APA exemption from notice-and-comment requirements for general statements of policy;

interpretative rules; and rules of agency organization, procedure, and practice
are inapplicable to agency suspensions. The legislative history of the APA expressed three reasons for this exemption. The first was to encourage agencies to

make these kinds of rules, 276 presumably to avoid having agencies conceal their
policies from the public to escape the procedural burdens of APA section 553.
There is no comparable reason to encourage agencies to suspend promulgated

rules. Furthermore, such suspensions would have to be revealed publicly to be
277

effective.
The second reason for the exemption was that policy statements and other

exempt actions varied so greatly in their nature and purpose that it would be
Procedures,73 GEo. L.J. 1007, 1011 (1985); Note, supra note 268, at 444, 446. Compare Texaco v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969) (substantial impact or palpable effects
test) with Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(binding norm test).
273. See Note, supra note 272, at 1015, 1020.
274. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. For the background of the case, see supranotes
56-68 and accompanying text.
275. See supra text accompanying note 85. Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the EPA was persuaded by subsequent public comments that
industry's assertions regarding standards applicable to hazardous waste incinerators were not supportable. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
276. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 18.
277. A de facto suspension might be implemented by the more informal procedure of declining
to enforce the promulgated rule for a period of time. This alternative practice, however, might
constitute a general statement of policy that the agency would be required to publish in the Federal
Register under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1982), or it might still be classified as substantive
rulemaking. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 115-21 (discussing the Gorsuch court's characterization of an EPA "policy" not to require the submission of permit applications as a substantive
rule).
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difficult for those outside the agency to distinguish between statements that
should be subject to public comment and those that should not.278 Obviously,
suspensions of substantive rules do not entail a comparable degree of variation.
As discussed earlier, virtually all suspensions implicate the twin purposes of
public participation in rulemaking through their substantial impact on the pub279
lic and their limitations on agency discretion.
The first two reasons for exempting policy statements represented a judgment that the need for efficient agency performance outweighed the need for
public participation. The third reason for the exemption was that interested persons in any event had the right under the APA280 to petition for reconsideration
of the rule. 281 This rationale is less a reason for the exemption than a further
justification for the balance drawn by the APA between the values of public
participation and the values of agency efficiency in exempting policy statements
and similar agency actions from notice-and-comment requirements. Because the
first two reasons relating to agency efficiency are inapplicable to agency suspensions, the right to petition for reconsideration is an unnecessary and inadequate
substitute for prior public comment on the decision to suspend, just as it would
be for prior public comment on the decisiorp to promulgate the rule in the first
instance. 282 Thus, the functions served by public participation, combined with
the absence of the countervailing considerations that justify the exemption of
policy statements, dictate that agency suspensions be subject to the procedural
requirements for informal rulemaking.
The remaining arguments one might present to classify a suspension as
something other than a rulemaking fail under close scrutiny. Section 705 of the
APA 2 83 authorizes an agency to postpone the effective date of its action "when
justice so requires," but only pending judicial review. This desire to maintain
the status quo pending judicial review does not similarly imply a desire to allow
an agency to suspend a rule without notice and comment pending further internal agency review of that rule. Although the APA's legislative history contains
no meaningful explanation of section 705,284 its mere existence suggests that
agencies do not otherwise possess broad authority to suspend rules without observing normal rulemaking procedures.
278. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 18.
279. See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
280. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982).
281. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 18.
282. The Supreme Court's decision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), suggests that an agency's failure to take affirmative action in response to a
petition under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982), if not unreviewable entirely, would be subject to
judicial review of the narrowest sort. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text; cf. Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (subjecting an agency's decision not to promulgate requested rules, made after extensive
rulemaking proceedings on a § 553(e) rulemaking petition, to "careful scrutiny").
283. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1982).
284. The Attorney General described this portion of the provision as a restatement of existing
law. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 230; ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 265, at
105.
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APA section 553(d) 285 requires publication of a final rule at least thirty
days before its effective date both to allow affected parties time to conform to the
requirements of the new rule and to permit the agency to discover and "correct

error or oversight."2 8 6 Congress presumably intended that these corrections be
made before the rule took effect, which necessarily implies that the corrections

would proceed without the delay entailed in prior notice and comment. The use
of the phrase "correct error or oversight," however, suggests that Congress con-

templated only minor or technical corrections of obvious errors, for which public comment would be "unnecessary.

'287

It does not suggest that Congress

meant to authorize summary suspensions pending policy reevaluations or substantive revisions of the rule. The Justice Department's legal memorandum supporting President Reagan's order directing a sixty-day suspension of the socalled "midnight regulations" of the Carter Administration2 88 argued that
agency discretion to establish initially an effective date beyond the thirty-day
minimum suggested that a subsequent "delay" in effective date was excluded

from notice-and-comment requirements. 289 The error in this reasoning is that
the agency's initial choice of effective date, although subject to considerable

agency discretion, is nevertheless open to public comment in the course of the
rule's promulgation. Any subsequent delay or suspension of the effective date

should be subject to similar opportunity for public comment. The conclusion
that agency suspensions constitute rulemaking does not mean that all suspensions must be preceded by public comment, but that the failure to do so may be
justified only within the terms of the good cause exception of the APA.290
2.

Applying the Good Cause Exception

29 1

In two caseS the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has read its opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Department of Transportation292 to authorize heightened procedural, as well as
substantive, review of agency suspensions. The Supreme Court's State Farm

opinion supports this conclusion. By establishing a presumption in favor of the
status quo embodied in an existing regulation, the Supreme Court imposed an
additional burden on an agency seeking to reverse that status quo. 2 9 3 It is im285. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1982).
286. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 20; see Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458, 467
(S.D. Fla. 1978).
287. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982); see infra text accompanying note 303.
288. See Presidential Memorandum of January 29, 1981, 3 C.F.R. 223, 223 (1981).
289. Presidential Memorandum Delaying Proposed and Pending Regulations, 5 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 55 (1981). The Justice Department memorandum even suggests, without providing any
support, that an agency may not have to provide an opportunity for comment on the intended effective date in the first instance. Id. at 57 n.2.
290. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982).
291. Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1983); National
Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 638 F.2d 752, 760-61 (3d Cir.
1982). For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 88-114, 143-53.
292. 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
293. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42. For discussion of this holding, see supra notes 200-09 and
accompanying text.
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material whether the reversal of position is represented by a suspension of the
existing rule rather than its outright revocation. In either case State Farm
clearly places on the agency an additional burden to supply a reasoned explanation for the change.2 94 If the agency bears a burden of overcoming the presumption against regulatory reversal, then it is particularly important that the reasons
presented by the agency be tested through the public comment process. This
burden exists in two situations. First, there are situations in which public comment may provide the agency with information that will assist it inreaching a
better or more accurate decision. Second, there are situations in which public
comment may help expose the agency's true motivation for its change of position, as opposed to the reasons publicly offered by the agency. The former situation is illustrated by the effect subsequent public comment had in changing the
EPA's regulatory views in NRDC and in EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Gorsuch.295 The latter is illustrated by the role public comment played in demonstrating the inadequate factual support for NHTSA's regulatory reversal in
Public Citizen v. Steed,2 96 and, concomitantly, in exposing the agency's policy
shift as the real motivation for change.297 Thus, the requirement of a reasoned
explanation for changes in agency position suggests that the good cause exception should have particularly limited application to an agency suspension of a
promulgated rule, which represents a reversal of the agency's former position in
much the same way as outright revocation of the rule.
On the other hand, the absence of an opportunity for public comment prior
to a truly temporary suspension may impinge on the values of public participation less significantly than would the absence of such comment prior to a revocation. The court in Public Citizen v. Department of Health and Human
Services2 98 made a fundamental error in viewing the impermanence of a suspension as a justification for characterizing the suspension as an action other than
rulemaking. 299 The reasons for classifying a suspension as a rulemaking apply
regardless of the length of the suspension period. Instead, the length of the suspension should be a factor in determining whether or not the agency has properly invoked the good cause exception: "If a rule ranks as a substantive
regulation, the limited nature of the rule cannot in itselfjustify a failure to follow
notice and comment procedures. We have recognized, however, that '[t]he more
expansive the regulatory reach of [agency] rules, ... the greater the necessity for

public comment.'

",300

294. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41.
295. 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see supra notes 88-128 and accompanying text for discussion
of Gorsuch.
296. 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Steed is discussed supra notes 221-60 and accompanying
text.
297. See Steed, 733 F.2d at 103 (emphasizing NHTSA's concession to Uniroyal that the three
primary sources of treadwear test variability were readily correctable).
298. No. 81-0820 (D.D.C. July 31, 1981) (mem.), aff'd, 671 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); see supra notes 11-27 for discussion of this case.
299. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
300. Council of the Southern Mountains v. Donavan, 653 F.2d 573, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (quoting American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir.
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Findings of good cause to promulgate rules without prior notice and com-

ment flow from balancing the general value of public participation against the
need for such participation and its impact on effective and efficient administra-

tion in the context of a specific rulemaking. The APA good cause exception is
limited to instances in which notice-and-comment procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. 30 1 The term "impracticable" refers to situations in which the notice-and-comment process would

unavoidably prevent the quick action necessary to fulfill the agency's functions.30 2 The term "unnecessary" refers to situations in which the action is so

minor or technical that little or no public interest is expected. 30 3 According to
the legislative history of the APA, the phrase "contrary to public interest"
merely supplements the terms "impracticable" and "unnecessary. '' 3° 4 However,
the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act states that
"contrary to public interest" connotes situations in which advance notice of the

rulemaking would be counterproductive because the rule depends on an element
of surprise to be effective.30 5 The legislative history of the APA makes clear that
30 6
the good cause exception is a narrow one.
Rapid agency action to suspend a rule without prior notice and comment to

confront an emergency may be justified more readily under the "impracticability" provision by the temporary nature of the suspension. The length of the

suspension period does not change the need for prompt action but it may change
the degree to which the public is affected and the related value of prior public
comment. 30 7 Thus, the impact of the agency's action may be inversely related to
the required showing of good cause. In the extreme, a suspension limited to a
very short period might have such minimal effects on the public that prior op-

portunity for public comment is not only impracticable, but also "unnecessary"
1981)); accord National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per

curiam).
301. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982). The APA also contains a good cause exception to the usual
requirement that a substantive rule be published at least 30 days before its effective date. Id.
§ 553(d)(3). This second exception generally is not an issue in suspension cases because any rule that
"relieves a restriction" is also an exception to the 30 day publication requirement. Id. § 553(d)(1).
302. The Senate Report on the APA speaks of public proceedings preventing the "due and required execution of the agency functions." S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 200. The House
Report somewhat more broadly refers to preventing the "due, timely, and required execution of
agency functions." Id. at 258.
303. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 200, 258.
304. See S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 200, 258.
305. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 265, at 31. A good example would be a rule
implementing price controls in an effort to fight inflation. In fact, the necessity for quick action in
imposing price controls was a factor that led Judge Leventhal to uphold the Economic Stabilization
Act's broad delegation of authority to the President. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 750-52 (D.D.C. 1971).
306. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 200, 258.
307. The court's finding in Council of the Southern Mountains v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (per curiam), that public comment prior to the six-month suspension would be impracticable, seems to stem in part from this sort of reasoning. Id. at 581-82. Similar reasoning also was
partly responsible for the finding of impracticability in a suspension that was for an indefinite period
up to a one-year maximum. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607, 611-12
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see supranotes 43-55 and accompanying text for discussion of Devine.
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in the sense that the suspension would prompt little public interest. 30 8
The short-term nature of a suspension instituted without public comment is
only one factor a reviewing court should consider as mitigating the harm caused
to the values of public participation and as helping to establish the agency's good
cause. Suspensions without prior comment generally should be limited to those
actions necessary to respond to emergencies created by external circumstances
unforeseen by the agency. Necessity is most compelling when health or safety
concerns are present, as was the case in Council of the Southern Mountains v.
Donovan 30 9 regarding mine safety devices, 310 or when a fundamental purpose of
the regulatory program is jeopardized, as was the case in NationalFederation of
FederalEmployees v. Devine 311 regarding the availability of meaningful health
benefit information and the continued participation of the largest employee benefit group. 31 2 Agency attempts, within the time constraints presented by the
need for prompt action, to consult informally with affected persons to help de-

termine the genuineness of the problem or the need for a rapid response should
be encouraged by judicial recognition of informal consultation as an additional
3 13
factor mitigating the absence of a public comment period.
Finally, suspensions exempted from notice-and-comment rulemaking
should be viewed as temporary responses to unexpected crises, with long-term or
3 14
permanent responses subject to the usual procedures of informal rulemaking.
308. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 725 F.2d 761
(D.C. Cir. 1984), the court found it "unnecessary to decide whether, and in what circumstances,"
the EPA was authorized "to stay existing regulations without notice and comment." Id. at 767. For
discussion of EPA, see supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
309. 653 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
310. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
311. 671 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
312. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in State Farm took the
position in dicta that a temporary suspension of the passive restraint requirement would have been
permissible while NHTSA studied an airbags-only alternative. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50 n.15.
Certainly the decision by automobile manufacturers to comply with Modified Standard 208 by installing detachable seatbelts rather than airbags was a change NHTSA neither expected-at least
when it promulgated the standard-nor controlled. The questions this change raised regarding the
standard's utility in reducing passenger injuries went to the heart of the agency's regulatory goals
and thus would have justified a temporary suspension to allow a reexamination of the program. It is
unclear, however, whether the Court contemplated an emergency suspension or one accompanied by
prior opportunity for public comment. Given NHTSA's ability in the spring of 1981 to conduct
notice-and-comment rulemaking on a temporary suspension at least as promptly as the rulemaking it
conducted to rescind the standard, an emergency suspension would not appear justified.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. This suggestion does not mean that courts
should require informal consultation. Such a requirement most likely would run afoul of the
Supreme Court's general proscription ofjudicially-mandated procedures beyond those mandated by
the APA or the agency's organic statute. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). Rather, the presence of informal consultation
should be a factor favorable to the agency in determining the balance to be struck in a good cause
case. The APA's admonition that reviewing courts take into account notions of harmless error
suggests the propriety of judicial consideration of this factor. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) ("due account should be taken of the rule of prejudicial error").
314. Professor Jordan suggests that emergency rules in general be limited to interim rules, with
an opportunity for public comment required for final rules. Jordan, supra note 268, at 171. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sustained, on an interim basis only,
regulations issued by the Department of Agriculture without prior public comment and further suggested that any emergency rule should be promulgated only as an interim rule. American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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The courts in good cause cases have stressed the importance of timing public
comments to precede the agency's commitment to a particular course of ac-

tion. 315 Public comment is most beneficial early in the decisionmaking process,
before the agency's psychological commitment to a course of action lessens its
receptiveness to public suggestions. 3 16 When immediate suspension is justified
on a short-term basis, however, public comment on any long-term suspension

may constitute an alternative that at least mitigates the damage to the value of
public participation. After all, an agency's commitment to a truly short-term,
interim suspension may not be much stronger than its commitment to a proposed suspension subject to public comment. Limiting an emergency suspension
to a fixed period of short duration also would ensure that the suspension will not
continue indefinitely. 317 Judicial authority to limit emergency suspensions to
the minimum duration possible, and thus to minimize departures from normal

rulemaking procedures, can be viewed as an aspect of hard look review. Hard
look review requires that an agency consider reasonably available alternatives to
its preferred course of action. In these situations, courts should require agencies
to consider procedural alternatives to long-term or indefinite emergency

suspensions.
One of the least supportable cases for an emergency suspension is made in

precisely the situation contemplated by President Reagan's Executive Order
12,291, which ordered the suspension of "major rules" that had not yet taken
effect in order to permit a reconsideration of their costs and benefits. 3 18 The
harm to be averted-excessive or unnecessary expenditures in compliance with a
regulatory command-although not unimportant, is less compelling than the
avoidance of a threat to public health or safety or the frustration of a fundamen-

tal regulatory program. More significantly, a policy-based reexamination of a
regulatory program is not an emergency response prompted by external events
315. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d
Cir. 1979); United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207, 214-15
(5th Cir. 1979). The APA's legislative history makes clear the preference for public comment prior
to agency decisionmaking. S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 264, at 358.
316. United States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 595 F.2d 207, 214-15 (5th
Cir. 1979).
317, Suspensions that end only on further agency action tend to remain in effect for excessive
periods, as illustrated by the history of the EPA's "new source" suspension. The EPA amended its
regulatory definition of "new sources," 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2), under the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. on May 19, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,452-53 (1980). In response to
industry criticism that the definition was overbroad, the EPA suspended the regulation without prior
notice and comment on September 9, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 59,317, 59,317-18 (1980). The suspension
was to continue in effect until completion of notice-and-comment rulemaking on an amendment of
the definition proposed that same day. Id. at 59,343. The rulemaking was not completed, and thus
the emergency suspension remained in effect, for just over four years, until September 26, 1984. 49
Fed. Reg. 37,998 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b) (1986)). The EPA's long delay might
have been subject to challenge under the APA as agency action "unreasonably withheld." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1) (1982); see Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 220 n.14 (1980) (noting the availability ofljudicial review of prolonged agency inaction in the context of an application for a renewal
permit, an adjudicatory rather than a rulemaking action). Even if judicial review were available,
however, the reviewing court might hesitate to order completion of the rulemaking within a specified
time and thus interfere with the agency's assessment of its own priorities. Of course, an "indefinite
suspension" that is never terminated is functionally equivalent to a revocation. NRDC, 683 F.2d at
763 n.23.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
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uncontrollable by the agency. If State Farm establishes the presumption that the
existing regulations best implement congressional policy, then an agency-initiated reexamination should raise the concern that the agency may be departing
from the policies favored by Congress as reflected in the agency's enabling statute. This concern is heightened when the reexamination is prompted by a
sweeping executive order that may emphasize policy considerations that are impermissible under a particular enabling statute or that are outweighed by other
statutorily specified factors. Courts should be especially hesitant in these circumstances to exempt the suspension from normal rulemaking procedures.
Prior public comment is fundamental in helping to maintain agency fidelity
to statutory purpose, either by dissuading the agency from implementing certain
regulatory changes or, failing that outcome, by better exposing to a reviewing
court the significance of the change. The three suspension cases that invalidated
emergency suspensions under the good cause provision-NRDC, Gorsuch, and
EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency 3 19 (EDF)-all
involved shifts in policy made by a new regulatory administration acting in compliance with Executive Order 12,291.320 The Public Citizen case should have
invalidated the Department of Health and Human Services suspension, made
without public comment, of the patient package insert program for precisely the
same reasons. 32 1 The agency's reexamination in Public Citizen of the "cost, necessity, and utility" of a major regulatory program was not prompted by external circumstances that created an emergency requiring an immediate agency
response nor did the agency evince any attempt to act diligently to accommodate
both the need for public participation and its own desire for change. Of course,
an agency change in policy is not necessarily proscribed by statute, but a court
concerned with fidelity to congressional policy should closely scrutinize not only
the substance of the change, but also the procedures used to effect the change.
Thus, the regulatory suspensions directed by Executive Order 12,291 in most
held invalid as
instances should have required prior public comment and been
322
emergency suspensions under the APA good cause exception.
319. 716 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), supersededby statute as stated in Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986) (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1985)); see supra
text accompanying notes 129-42 for discussion of EDF.
320. See supra notes 56-65, 88-106, 129-42 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
The remedy in such cases typically is to reinstate the rule with its original effective date. See NRDC,
683 F.2d at 768.
321. See supra notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
322. The Justice Department's legal memorandum on Executive Order 12,291 conceded that
suspensions for purposes of regulatory reassessment constituted rulemaking, but suggested that the
good cause exception might apply either if the issue whether there should be any rule at all was
discussed fully in the rule's comment process or if the interim effect of the rule would impose substantial compliance costs. The memorandum did not cite any case support for these suggestions.
Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Federal Regulation," 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 59, 66 (1981).
The court in National Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 683 F.2d
752 (3d Cir. 1982), expressly rejected the suggestion that providing an opportunity to comment prior
to promulgation of a rule on the option of adopting no rule at all is sufficient to encompass the
subsequent repeal of the rule without further public comment. Id. at 763-64. The courts have not
addressed directly the more difficult question whether an agency's decision to suspend a regulation
to allow a reassessment of the substantial compliance costs the regulation will impose by itself satisfies the APA's good cause provision. That a regulatory action is reasonable in substance does not
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B. Substantive Review
With the growing recognition by both the judiciary and agencies themselves
that suspensions are rulemaking actions subject to notice-and-comment procedures, attention is likely to focus on substantive challenges to agency suspensions. As the earlier discussion of State Farm suggests, 3 2 3 an agency suspension
represents a change in the status quo and therefore must be justified by a reasoned analysis for the change and for the rejection of available alternative
courses of action. Heightened scrutiny of the agency's-action may be appropriate to ensure its conformity with statutory policy. Courts do not, and should
not, require the same degree of analytical support for all suspensions, nor should
they uniformly apply heightened scrutiny to all suspensions. A more discriminating approach should be applied based primarily on the following three factors: First, the reviewing court should consider the scope and importance of the
regulatory suspension; second, the reviewing court should consider the length of
time the regulation is being suspended; and third, the reviewing court should
consider the reason for the suspension-whether the suspension reflects the
agency's reaction to external circumstances or whether it reflects an agency-initi3 24
ated shift in policy.
The first two factors, the scope and importance of the suspension and its
duration, both are related to the significance of the agency action and its potential effects on the public. The demands on the agency to identify its goals, the
alternative means of potentially achieving the goals, and the support for each
alternative-the demands of what Professor Diver terms "comprehensive rationality" 32 5-- are extraordinary if rigorously applied. The burdens placed on
the agency to explain and support a regulatory suspension should therefore be
commensurate with the nature of the suspension. The quantum of support required to justify a sixty-day suspension of only a small part of a regulatory program should be considerably less than that required to justify an indefinite
suspension-or permanent revocation-of the entire program.
The third factor, the reason for the suspension, attempts to identify those
circumstances in which the suspension reflects a shift in agency policy, which
then can be measured against the congressional policies embodied in the
agency's enabling statute. Although one of the roles of judicial review is to ensure that the agency's action is supported by reasoned analysis, a particular conitself provide procedural good cause. See Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134, 143-45 (1st Cir. 1980).
This Article suggests that a court should rarely, if ever, validate an emergency suspension on this
basis, and almost certainly not if the emergency suspension is of indefinite duration. The court's
decision in Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. Schweiker, 571 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Tex. 1983), modified,
758 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1985), supports this suggestion. The court in Baylor, noting that even
statutory or judicial deadlines for agency action do not in themselves constitute good cause, held that
an agency's desire to comply with the President's timetable for release of the budget did not constitute good cause to excuse notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 379. The timetable set by a presidential executive order similarly should present a weaker case for good cause than deadlines set by a
statute or judicial order.
323. See supra notes 200-20 and accompanying text.
324. The first and third factors should be equally applicable to rule revocations or amendments
that signify a reversal in the agency's course of action.
325. Diver, Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 393, 396 (1981).
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cern raised by the reversal of a prior rule is that the change may signal the

agency's departure from underlying congressional intent. Because not all suspensions raise this concern, courts should be sensitive to those circumstances
that do cause real concern. In general a suspension that reflects an agency's
reaction to external circumstances, essentially those beyond the agency's control, is less likely to indicate a shift in agency policy than would a suspension

that reflects an agency-initiated reassessment.
A suspension that is primarily reactive in nature may involve information

made available to an agency almost immediately after it promulgates the rule in
question-for example, when members of the affected public advise the agency
of unintended adverse consequences of the rule.326 In other situations the infor-

mation may become available only with the passage of time. This passage of
time may demonstrate the rule's failure to work as predicted, it may result in a
substantial change in the social or economic conditions existing at the time the

rule was promulgated, or a significant new discovery may take place that affects

the choices embodied in the rule. 327 Of course, an agency's response to this new
information may be accompanied by a change in agency policy as well, but it is
fair to assume that a policy shift is less often the principal motivation for the
suspension than in the case of an agency-initiated reassessment. As previously

noted, the record compiled during promulgation of the rule may facilitate more
meaningful judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of the agency's decisionmaking 32 8 -the adequacy of the agency's explanation for the suspension, its consideration of alternatives, and the reasonableness of its ultimate decision. The mere

fact the agency has changed course in these instances, however, should not trig326. The problem of a rule having unintended adverse effects becomes particularly pronounced
when an agency conducts a rulemaking of very broad scope. For example, during the course of a
major rulemaking an agency may make a particular change in its final rule that was not part of its
proposal and thus escaped detailed public scrutiny during the comment process. This seems to have
been the cause of the EPA's suspension of its criteria for determining a "new source" of water
pollution discharges under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2) (1982). The EPA's proposal for revising the entire program for issuing permits for such discharges did not suggest any change
for these criteria. See 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,854 (1979). The final rule included a change in the
criteria that the EPA described merely as a clarification. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,342-43, 37,452-53
(1980). Permit writers and industry representatives promptly informed the EPA that its clarification
actually had unintended adverse consequences for such industrial facilities as petroleum refineries.
The EPA suspended its regulatory criteria, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,318 (1980), proposed a revision, 45 Fed.
Reg. 59,343 (1980), and four years later promulgated the revised final rule. 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)
(1985). For background of the promulgation, see 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998 (1984). A similar problem
apparently led the EPA to conclude that the issues raised by the inclusion of vessel emissions in its
regulatory definition of "stationary source" under the Clean Air Act deserved "greater ventilation"
than they had received in the rulemaking. 46 Fed. Reg. 36,695, 36,697 (1981). The court in National Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 725 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir.
1984) however, rejected an intervenor's claim that inadequate notice of the scope of the EPA's
rulemaking justified the agency's suspension and subsequent revocation of the vessel emission requirements. Id. at 773-74.
327. For example, in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the Federal Communications Commission's
(FCC) sweeping deregulation of commercial radio was premised on the significant changes in the
industry that had taken place during the nearly 50 years following passage of the Communications
Act. Id. at 1420 & n.7. The court, after applying a hard look, upheld most aspects of the FCC's
actions, which involved shifts in policy as well as a response to changed circumstances. Id. at 1425
& n.23.
328. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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ger a more skeptical scrutiny that would improperly deprive the agency of the

necessary flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances.
A program reassessment may consist of the agency's reinterpretation either
of evidence which is essentially the same as that available during the prior
rulemaking or of the agency's statutory purpose. The agency may clearly articu-

late the new policy that motivates its reassessment, in which event a reviewing
court must ensure that the policy not only finds reasoned support in the record
but is authorized by statute. 329 There is nothing inherently wrong with such
policy shifts, 3 30 and it would be improper to view them with uniform suspicion.

The prior rule may have reflected a policy not authorized by statute, or it may
have reflected only one of several permissible policy choices. An agency change

in policy and its conformance to congressional intent, however, is not merely
one more factor to scrutinize in addition to the reasonableness of the agency's
decisionmaking. The circumstances surrounding the promulgation of the prior

rule may suggest that the rule best comports with congressional intent (for example, when the promulgation follows on the heels of the statute's enactment)
and that the change in policy supporting the agency suspension should be presumed to depart from that intent. 331 A court's increased concern about fidelity
to legislative intent should affect the nature and scope of its review.
The most intensive judicial scrutiny should be reserved for those cases in

which circumstances suggest that the agency is attempting to portray its suspension as a response to new information or changed circumstances in an effort to
disguise the reordering of priorities that actually motivate the change. The values attributable to public participation in rulemaking-improving agency deci-

sionmaking by providing it with additional sources of information and allowing
members of the public an opportunity to influence decisions that may affect

them-are predicated largely on the agency's disclosure of the considerations
relevant to its decision. Disclosure facilitates scrutiny not only by the public,

but by the court as well, thus aiding the court's performance of its role in ensur332
Of
ing that the agency exercises its delegated powers within statutory limits.
course, because there always will be situations that tempt agencies to disguise
329. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 735 F.2d 1525, 1529-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (agreeing with the agency that the reduction of paperwork costs was a legitimate factor
under the statute, but finding inadequate explanation for certain revisions of the log requirements
imposed on truck drivers).
330. Justice Rehnquist noted: "A change in administration brought about by the people casting
their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and
benefits of its programs and regulations." State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). A dramatic change in agency policy need not be the result ofan election
but can result instead from a change in the appointed decisionmaker, such as occurred at the EPA
with the replacement of Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford with William Ruckelshaus. Of
course, the reappraisal still must be based on a policy that is permissible under the agency's enabling
statute and that is reasonably supported by the record.
331. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42 (noting that a "settled course of behavior" creates a
presumption that it best carries out congressional policies); Smythe, supra note 187, at 1948-49 (suggesting that whether an agency's policy choice in rescinding a rule reflects congressional intent is
related to the timing of the passage of the regulatory statute, the promulgation of the regulation, the
rescission of the regulation, and any change in administration).
332. Professor Byse contends that Congress has been willing to delegate authority to administrative agencies at least in part because it depends on judicial review to ensure that the agencies exercise

1987]

SUSPENSIONS OF AGENCY RULES

their true motives-such as when the motive is particularly controversial, politically-charged, or of dubious legality-it is unrealistic to expect that judicial review can serve more than a modest role in preventing nondisclosure. What
reviewing courts can and should do is provide a disincentive for agency failure to
disclose the policy basis of decisions to suspend or otherwise reverse a promulgated rule. Thus, when circumstances suggest a contrived agency attempt to
justify as fact-based a suspension that in reality reflects a policy change, the
court should review with close scrutiny the reasonableness of the agency's decisionmaking-the adequacy of its factual support for its purported explanation,
the extent of its consideration of alternatives, and the rationality of its ultimate
choices. An agency faced with the risk of being subjected to such a hard look
may opt instead to articulate more clearly the policy shift motivating its decision
333
to suspend.
Thus, this approach to substantive review of agency suspensions does not
heighten the scope of review simply because a suspension constitutes a change of
the course taken by the agency in its prior rule, but instead affects the scope of
review depending on the circumstances and nature of that change. This approach can be illustrated by applying it to the four cases that have decided substantive challenges to agency suspensions.
A relatively relaxed scope of review was applied in the Southern Mountains334 and Devine 335 cases. Both cases involved suspensions undertaken primarily in response to unexpected events-concerns about mine safety devices,
and the unavailability of meaningful health benefit information and possible
withdrawal of the largest employee benefit group, respectively-that were beyond the control of the agencies involved. The unexpected and serious nature of
those events helped justify the decisions to suspend without prior opportunity
for public comment. The approaches suggested in this Article for procedural
and substantive review reinforce each other by reserving the closest judicial scrutiny for policy-based reassessments of regulatory programs. The mine safety
regulation suspended in Southern Mountains was of considerable importance to
health and safety, whereas the suspended provision in Devine, requiring an annual open season permitting transfers between health benefit plans, involved
somewhat less significant concerns of cost and convenience. The suspensions,
336
however, were limited in duration to six months and one year, respectively.
Thus, the three principal factors affecting the scope of substantive review support the absence of any heightened scrutiny by the courts in these two suspentheir powers within statutory limits. Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33
ADMIN. L. Rlv. 183, 191 (1981).
333. William Pedersen, a former EPA official, believes that the presence of hard look review
improves the quality of agency decisionmaking. Pedersen, FormalRecordsand Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59-60 & n.87 (1975).
334. Southern Mountains, 653 F.2d at 583; see supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
335. Devine, 671 F.2d at 612; see supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
336. Due in part to the "limited nature" of the suspension, the court in Southern Mountains
declined to order disclosure of ex parte conversations between the agency and industry representatives. Southern Mountains, 653 F.2d at 579 n.26.
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sion cases. 337
Application of the approach articulated by this Article suggests that the
338
suspension of the patient package insert program challenged in Public Citizen
should have been subjected to a more intensified scope of review than the extremely soft glance applied by the district court and affirmed by the court of
appeals. 339 The affected regulations were significant both in terms of scope and
subject matter. The suspension stopped the pilot program entirely for ten drugs,
which was designed to test the usefulness of inserts before making them
mandatory for all prescription drugs. Although the regulations may have lacked
the obvious, life-saving implications of the mine safety device requirements at
issue in Southern Mountains, the provision of this information had been justified
by the FDA as enhancing drug therapy and thus involved important public
health concerns. 34° Moreover, the FDA suspension, far from being a temporary
measure, involved an indefinite suspension "to allow wholesale reevaluation of a
major regulatory program." 341 Finally, the suspension was not in response to
new information or changed circumstances, but was a policy-based reassessment
of the program's "cost, necessity, and utility" prompted by a change in FDA
management and Executive Order 12,291. The FDA briefly referred to the purpose of its suspension, 342 but provided no reasoned explanation for the need to
reassess the pilot program. The narrow extent of substantive judicial review,
however, was reflected in the district court's conclusory observation that the
FDA "would appear to be engaged in a reasonable examination of a controversial plan."3 43 The scope of substantive review in this case scarcely rises even to
the level of "minimum rationality" review rejected by the Supreme Court in
State Farm,3 44 much less the careful consideration of a reasoned agency explanation of its policy-based suspension and the conformance of the changed policy
with the agency's statutory mandate that the nature of this suspension dictated.
Any meaningful review would have invalidated the FDA action as inadequately
explained and justified.
The most intense judicial scrutiny should be reserved for cases such as the
NHTSA suspension invalidated in Public Citizen v. Steed.34 5 Although the
court never determined whether the treadwear grading standards suspended by
337. Both cases can be criticized, however, for their noncritical review of the agencies' explanations for the suspensions and the agencies' failure to consider procedural alternatives. See supra text
accompanying notes 177-86. In Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d
1209 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court rejected the agency's argument that only minimal explanation was
required for a rule rescission the agency characterized as "'an interim decision in an extended consideration of smoking policy,'" id. at 1217 (quoting Brief for Respondent), but unlike the suspensions in Southern Mountains and Devine, that rescission by its own terms was permanent and clearly
involved important policy issues.
338. Public Citizen, No. 81-0820, slip op. at 2; Public Citizen, 671 F.2d at 519.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
340. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754, 60,754 (1980).
341. Public Citizen, 671 F.2d at 520 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
342. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
343. Public Citizen, No. 81-0820, slip op. at 2.

344. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9.
345. 733 F.2d 93, 98-105 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see supra notes 221-48 and accompanying text for
discussion of Steed.
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346
they were
NHTSA were safety standards or consumer information standards,
to
consummeaningful
most
was
that
the tire grading program's characteristic
347
by the
viewed
was
The suspension was indefinite in duration and, indeed,
ers.
34 8
to
attempt
its
in
failed
NHTSA
Most significantly,
court as a de facto repeal.
did
data
The
data.
factual
justify its action as one supported by newly developed
not appear to be materially different from the information available to the
agency when it first promulgated the standards, 349 but instead seemed designed
to obscure NHTSA's true motivation, which was to designate as the most important factor in standard setting the minimization of industry compliance
costs. 350 That the suspension followed a change in agency administration supported the conclusion that a policy shift had prompted the decision. NHTSA's
attempt to portray the suspension as a response to new information rather than
to articulate a shift in policy, presumably out of a well-founded fear that the new
by statute, led to the intense level of scrutiny applied
policy was not authorized
3 51
court.
Steed
by the

V.

CONCLUSION

It is a fact of administrative life that the scope of review applied to agency
suspensions is not uniform, but varies according to a number of factors, both
tangible and intangible.35 2 Although the scope of review cannot be assigned to
neat pigeonholes, articulation of the factors that influence judicial review may
serve to guide not only the courts but administrative agencies in the proper performance of their duties.
The agency attorney now faced with the question of when and how to suspend a promulgated rule should assume that every suspension, whether shortterm or long-term, will properly be characterized as a rulemaking. The agency
attorney can ill-afford to treat a suspension as a "quick fix" that can readily be
346. Steed, 733 F.2d at 99.
347. Id. at 94.
348. Id. at 98.
349. Id. at 100.
350. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
351. A similar effort by NHTSA to disguise its policy shift led to the Supreme Court's hard look
in State Farm. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
352. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1413, 1425 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("More aggressive review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard may be appropriate in any number of circumstances."); National Resources
Defense Council v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that
the stringency of review depends on such factors as the agency's needs, expertise, and impartiality);
Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969
DUKE L.J. 199, 224 (noting that the court is likely to be more tolerant of error in subsidiary proceedings when it sympathizes with the agency's end result than when it does not); see also Remarks of
Judge Oakes: Institute on FederalAgencies and the Public Interest, ABA Section ofAdministrative
Law Panel IV, JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 26 ADMIN. L. REv. 545, 575 (1974):
Any realist would have to concede that a judge's views as to the extent of judicial review
vary.., with the character of the administrative agency, the nature of the problems with
which it deals, the confidence the agency has won, the degree to which the review would
interfere with the agency's functions, or burden the courts, and the nature of the proceedings before the administrative agency, as well as other factors.
Id. at 575.
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applied whenever the agency experiences trouble with one of its rules. Similarly,
a new administration cannot in blanket fashion use agency suspensions to provide itself with a clean slate on which to remake regulatory decisions. Moreover,
the length and nature of any particular suspension should not affect its classification as rulemaking. Rather, these factors should be examined for their relevance
in providing the agency with good cause to exempt the suspension from prior
opportunity for public comment. Both procedural and substantive review are
likely to-and should consciously-focus more intensely on those suspensions
that involve significant shifts in agency policy, when it is particularly important
to subject the agency's decision to both public and judicial scrutiny. The most
intensive scrutiny should be applied to an agency's nondisclosure of a policy
change that motivates its suspension, thereby encouraging agencies to identify
more clearly such changes for public comment and judicial review.

